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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1939-19401
PERSONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Zoning
N the period covered by this survey two zoning cases of
some importance were decided by the Illinois Supreme
Court. Both cases emphasize the fact that the courts, while
paying lip service to the doctrine that the validity of zoning
legislation is not to be determined by the effect such legislation may have on particular pieces of property, are nevertheless willing to listen to arguments designed to question
the constitutionality of such legislation because of allegedly
excessive burdens cast upon specific property. In one of
these cases, Taylor v. Village of Glencoe, the court held
invalid a zoning ordinance insofar as it restricted the
complainant's property to residential uses when it appeared
that the property was practically surrounded by commercial uses which had existed prior to the enactment of the
zoning ordinance and which had been permitted to continue
thereafter. This case apparently means that if the character of a neighborhood is already determined by the types
of establishments existing at the time a zoning law goes into
effect, this character cannot be arrested or changed by a
1 The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year but is published rather for the purpose of merely calling attention to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that
of the judicial year, embracing from 372 Ill. 1 to 373 Ill. 639; from 301 Ill. App.
217 to 305 Il. App. 626; and from 106 F. (2d) 1 to 111 F. (2d) 912.
2 372 Ill.. 509, 25 N.E. (2d) 62 (1940).
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prohibition upon the extension of the character-determining
uses. If this interpretation of the significance of the case
is correct, municipalities are apparently powerless to arrest
by zoning legislation the development and extension of commercial uses in semi-built-up areas which ought to be limited
to residential uses for the welfare of the inhabitants.
In the second case, Harmon v. City of Peoria, an ordinance placing the plaintiff's property in a one-family residential district was held unreasonable and void in view of
the fact that a majority of the houses in the block in which
the plaintiff's property was situated were used for income
purposes, that is, the accommodation of roomers, boarders,
and renters. The court pointed out that the plaintiff could,
under the ordinance, rent and serve meals to four persons,
but could not rent a portion of the premises as a housekeeping unit to a family even though the family should consist of
only two persons. In the final analysis, the classifications in
the ordinance rested, the court held, on the effect of double
kitchen facilities, since the kitchen alone would distinguish
the position of families from that of boarder-roomers in many
cases. This decision appears to be very sound and brings
into question the wisdom as well as the validity of many
fine distinctions embodied in zoning laws, particularly in the
setting up of one-family dwelling districts.
Torts
The principles affecting the question of municipal liability for damages arising out of blasting and soil subsidence in
connection with the construction of the Chicago subway, discussed in a recent number of this review,4 were analyzed by
the Appellate Court in Baker v. Healy Company.5 The court
remanded the case with directions to overrule defendant's
motion to dismiss, pointing out that under the decision in
Macer v. O'Brien,' a municipality may be liable for damage
resulting from the performance of intrinsically dangerous
work upon its streets even though negligence is not shown
and the work is performed by an independent contractor.
3 373 IMl. 594, 27 N.E. (2d) 525 (1940).
R. Wieferich and J. Richard, "Some Problems Arising from Municipal SubCHICAGo-KENT LAW REVmw 252 (1939).
5 302 IMl. App. 634, 24 N.E. (2d) 228 (1939).
6 356 Il. 486, 190 N.E. 904 (1934).
4

way Construction," 17
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The anomolous distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions of a city for the purpose of determining
the question of tort liability was continued by the Supreme
Court in Taylor v. City of Berwyn,7 holding that injuries
arising out of the negligence of city police officers engaged
in the pursuit of a suspect through a neighboring village
could not be made the basis for a claim against the city.
The persistence of claimants and their lawyers in bringing
suits against municipalities for damages arising out of the
actions of police officers, in spite of the repeated and positive declarations of the courts that police officers are agents
of the state and not of the municipality employing them and
that the latter is not liable for their acts,' is evidence
either of ignorance of the law in this respect or of the hope
that the courts will some day weaken in their defense of an
irrational principle.
In Storen v. City of Chicago,9 the Supreme Court has
again emphasized that while cities and villages mayw be
liable for injuries arising out of their negligence in maintaining streets and sidewalks they are only required to exercise reasonable care and diligence and are not insurers
against accidents. Permitting the depression of a curb for
an entrance to a private driveway was not negligence, the
court held, although as a result of this break in the curb a
car was forced by a collision onto the parkway, striking a
child playing thereon. Curbs are established primarily for
drainage and cleaning purposes and not for protection, the
court found. The factual situation presented in this case is
new but the decision is in accord with previous holdings.1 0
Indebtedness
In four cases dealing with the constitutional and statutory
limitations upon municipal indebtedness, the Supreme Court
held that such indebtedness is not reduced by the amount of
cash on hand subject to general disbursement but is reduced
7372 Ill. 124, 22 N.E. (2d) 930 (1939).

8 Craig v. City of Charleston, 180 IMI.154, 54 N.E. 184 (1899); Evans v. City of
Kankakee, 231 IM. 223, 83 Ill. 223 (1907).
9 373 IlM.530, 27 N.E. (2d) 53 (1940).
10 Wheeler v. City of Le Roy, 296 IMI. 579, 130 N.E. 330 (1921); Boender v. City
of Harvey, 251 Ill. 228, 95 N.E. 1084 (1911).
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by the amount of cash or bonds on hand in a sinking fund established for the sole purpose of discharging debts;" that,
after the extension of credit to a municipality and the entry
of a confirmation judgment for public benefits in local improvement proceedings and in the absence of a showing
that the municipality is ready to raise the amount by taxation, such benefits are debts within the meaning of the constitution; 12 that bonds issued to fund a tort judgment against
a village do not increase the indebtedness of the municipality
since they merely evidence an existing debt; 1 that neither
the revenue bonds issued by a municipality to defray the
cost of constructing a waterworks system (and payable solely out of the income from the system) nor the agreement of
the municipality to pay a fixed rental per month for each
hydrant used, constituted debts of the municipality, since
"no physical property presently owned by the municipality
could be called upon to pay for the new facilities" and since
the~city did not obligate itself to pay the bonds or pay for
any fixed number of hydrants for any specified time. 4 The
last case is particularly significant because the obligations
of the municipality were contained in ordinances of a standard type used in the construction of waterworks projects
through the co-operation and aid of the Public Works Administration of the Federal Works Agency. Hence the legality of other municipal waterworks systems financed by federal government grants and revenue bonds is assured insofar as questions of municipal debt limitations are concerned.
Contracts
The statutory provision authorizing the employment of
teachers, principals, and superintendents in the public
schools for periods up to three years 5 was held valid in the
case of Sloan v. School Directors.6 Prior to the adoption of
this statute the court had held that a board of school directors had no authority to employ a teacher for a term to
commence after the next succeeding election of board mem11 People v. Hamilton, 373 Ill. 124, 25 N.E. (2d) 517 (1940).
12 People v. Crane, 372 Ill. 228, 23 N.E. (2d) 337 (1939).
18 Elmhurst Bank v. Village of Bellwood, 372 Il. 204, 23 N.E. (2d) 41 (1939).
14 Simpson v. City of Highwood, 372 Ill. 212, 23 N.E. (2d) 62 (1939).
1s 373 IIl. 511, 26 N.E. (2d) 846 (1940).
15 111. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 122, § 136b.
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bers."7 The rule in these earlier cases was formulated in
an effort to prevent a school board from tying the hands of
its successors and perhaps thwarting the will of the voters
by entering into contracts to be carried out wholly in the
future. Apparently, however, the commencement and duration of municipal employment contracts is subject to legislative control.
Police Power
8 an ordinance
In Village of South Holland v. Stein"
making it unlawful for any person to go into a private residence
for the purpose of soliciting orders for goods, merchandise,
or services of any description without a permit to be issued
by the village board upon application and a finding that the
applicant is a person of good moral character and engaged
in a legitimate enterprise, was held to violate the state and
federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and
press as applied to one arrested and fined for selling publications of an organization known as "Jehovah's Witnesses."
The court was apparently influenced in reaching this conclusion by a decision of the United States Supreme Court which
reversed the conviction of a member of that sect, under a
similar ordinance.'
In an earlier decision the Illinois Supreme Court had held invalid an ordinance making it "unlawful for any person . . . to distribute . . . upon any street
...
sidewalk... or other public place . .. any circular . . .
handbill... etc." on the ground that the city had no authority, express or implied, to pass such an ordinance and that it
was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. 20 However, in the City of Chicago v. Rhine,"' the court sustained
an ordinance which prohibited the sale of any article (including magazines) on any street in the Loop district. This
decision stressed the power of municipalities over streets
and the need for measures to avoid congestion in the area to
which the ordinance applied. These cases indicate that subtle distinctions may determine the scope of the protection
17 Stevenson v. School Directors, 87 In. 255 (1877); Davis v. School Directors, 92
Ill.
293 (1879).
18 373 Ill. 472, 26 N.E. (2d) 868 (1940).
19 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938).
20 City of Chicago v. Schultz, 341 Ill. 208, 173 N.E. 276 (1930).
21 363 Il. 619, 2 N.E. (2d) 905 (1936).
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afforded by the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press. This fact is, of course, well known to lawyers
but is bewildering to laymen who are apt to find difficulty in
recognizing the distinction between selling pamphlets in the
Loop, outside the Loop, or in private residential districts.
Judgments
In Moore v. Town of Browning,2 2 a case of first impression in Illinois, the court held that mandamus would lie to
compel a town to pay a judgment rendered more than seven
years prior to the filing of the petition although no execution
had been issued on the judgment and it had not been revived
by scire facias. The court held that "a writ of mandamus
performs the same office as a scire facias, and . . . the
judgment could have no greater force if it was revived by
scire facias."
Judgment creditors of municipal corporations were also
given encouragement in another decision, People v. Village
of Glencoe,2 3 which held that mandamus would lie to compel
a village to pay a condemnation judgment out of surplus
money in the garbage fund. Although it was held in People v.
2 4 that the holder
City of Cairo
of a judgment against a city
for work in grading and filling streets was entitled to a writ
of mandamus to compel the city to pay the judgment out of
surplus money in the general fund, improvement fund, and
the fund for retirement of bonds, it has never been entirely
clear that surpluses in funds set up for specific purposes, particularly in funds derived from special taxes, could be diverted to other funds or used for other purposes. In the light
of the instant decision such surpluses apparently are to be
deemed "free" money available for disbursement against
any legitimate obligations of the municipality.
Publicationand Posting of Ordinances
The Supreme Court held in Simpson v. City of Highwood25 that a city, constructing a waterworks system under
a statute which provided that the authorizing ordinance
should be "published once in a newspaper published in such
22 373 I. 583, 27 N.E. (2d) 533 (1940).
23 372 i1. 280, 23 N.E. (2d) 697 (1939).
24 50 I1. 154 (1869).
25 372 IlM.212, 23 N.E. (2d) 62 (1939).
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municipality" or posted in three public places if there was
no "newspaper so published," was required to post rather
than publish such ordinance where the only newspaper published in the city was printed elsewhere and circulated free.
The court conceded that a newspaper is published in the
community where it is first circulated and that the place of
printing is immaterial2 but held that a newspaper printed
in another city and distributed free in a municipality "partakes more of the nature of a handbill or circular for the
benefit of its advertisers than a newspaper." Posting,
rather than publication in such a "newspaper," was required under the statute, the court decided. There was no
question raised as to the "newspaper" being a secular paper
of general circulation within the requirements of Chapter
100, Section 5, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1939. Hence the factor which prevented the paper from being a "newspaper"
within the meaning of the statute was apparently its free
distribution. It is therefore essential that ordinances and
notices, required by law to be published, should be published
in a newspaper which is (1) secular, (2) published, (i.e.,
first circulated) in the community, (3) of general circulation
in the community and (4) distributed to paying subscribers.
Publication in a "newspaper" not meeting these tests is of
no effect.
Officers
Municipal officers are generally held to be exempt from
personal liability for unlawful acts committed in their official legislative capacity, provided such acts were committed in good faith. However, a deliberate attempt on the
part of park district officers to evade a statute requiring
bonds to be sold at par, by accepting a bid which on its
face was a par bid but which was accompanied by a
charge of $71,000 for services to be rendered by an agent
of the bidder in appearing before the legislature for the purpose of securing the passage of a validating act, was held,
in Chicago Park District v. Herczel & Co.,2 7 to be such a
gross breach of duty as to subject the officers and the sureties on their bonds to liability to -the district. The payment
26
27

Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 IlM. 110 (1877).
373 Il. 326, 26 N.E. (2d) 119 (1940).
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of the $71,000 was illegal, the court declared, not only because
it resulted in the sale of bonds below par, but also because
the object of the expenditure, lobbying for the passage of
legislation, was against public policy and was not a corporate purpose. In the only other case found on the personal
liability of municipal officers for a sale of bonds below par,
the court indicated by way of dictum that "the officers were
probably personally liable." 28 The expenditure of municipal
funds for lobbying, however, has never been condemned in
this state heretofore where the purpose of the lobbying has
been to present the interests of the municipality to the legislature in a direct and honest manner and not secretly to importune individual legislators through appeals to their personal interests. 29 The Supreme Court, in the instant case,
made no effort to analyze the nature of the services rendered
by the lobbyist in securing the enactment of legislation validating the park district's bond issue. It is not safe to assume,
however, that there has been any substantial change in the
doctrines laid down in the earlier cases on this subject.
CORPORATIONS

The vexing problem as to constitutional liability for the
debts of a defunct bank has broken out in another directionthis time to compel the shareholders of a holding corporation owning bank stock to stand responsible therefor. While
liability has not yet been established, it has been held in
Flanagan v. Madison Square State Bank 0 that a complaint
designed to test this question was not subject to a motion
to strike, as the powers of a court of equity are sufficiently
broad to permit an investigation to determine who the "real"
owners of such bank stock may be. If judgment against such
shareholders be ultimately sustained, the corporate entity
theory is well on the way to dismemberment.
Rights against a dissolved corporation and its property
were concerned in Markus v. Chicago Title & Trust ComSherlock v. Village of Winnetka, 68 Ill.
530 (1873).
29 Meehan v. Parsons, 271 Ill.546, 111 N.E. (2d) 529 (1916); Baltzer v. City of
Chicago, 260 Ill.
App. 384 (1931).
3 302 Ill.App. 468, 24 N.E. (2d) 202 (1939). See also the coxnpanion case of
Galinski v. Adler, 302 I1. App. 474, 24 N.E. (2d) 205 (1939).
28
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pany,31 in which the mortgagee of corporate property was
allowed to foreclose his lien despite the fact that the corporation had been dissolved more than two years prior to the
institution of the foreclosure suit. The then owner of the
mortgaged premises contended that they were free of the
lien, because since no action would be permitted against the
corporation at such late date, 32 the essential debt to support
the mortgage was lacking. 3 Comparing the dissolution of a
corporation to the death of a human mortgagor, the court
found that the lien might continue though the personal remedy be gone and that hence the statute relied on had no
application.
MASTER AND SERVANT

Agency
Three decisions of the Appellate Court falling within the
broad field of agency and treating subjects not elsewhere discussed in this survey may be noted here. The so-called
"opinion of the court" in Kaspar American State Bank v.
Oul Homestead Association 4 is illustrative of the reluctance
of some judges to yield to statutory abandonment of the incongruous formalism of descriptio personae in even so practical a field of laymen's law as negotiable instruments.
Section 20 of the negotiable instruments law 5 provides
in part:
Where the instrument contains, or a person adds to his signature,
words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of the principal, or in a
representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly
authorized....

The note in litigation was on the usual printed form and
contained the customary confession of judgment clause. It
31 373 Ill. 557, 27 N.E. (2d) 463 (1940).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32 § 157.94
tion . . . shall not take away or impair

tion .

.

provides: "The dissolution of a corporaany remedy given against such corpora-

. if suit thereon is brought and service of process had within two years

after the date of such dissolution."
83 For support of this familiar principle see Burgett v. Osborne, 172 Iln. 227,
50 N.E. 206 (1898).
34 301 Ill. App. 326, 22 N.E. (2d) 785 (1939). Notes, 18 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REv3ZW
196, 28 Ill. B. J. 178.
35

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 98, § 40.
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purported to bind the "undersigned jointly and severally,"
and was signed:
Oul Homestead Association
Albert Hornick, Pres.
James L. Preisler, Sec'y
James Bican, Treas.

The justice who wrote the "opinion of the court," while
recognizing the general operation of Section 20 in eliminating
the doctrine of descriptio personae from the field of negotiable instruments, nevertheless took the unrealistic position
that the joint language of the note indicated an intention that
the officers should be bound personally. Although contained
in the "opinion of the court," this position represents the view
of only one of the three justices. One wrote a vigorous opinion
dissenting from the view taken, and the other concurred in
the judgment on the sole ground apparently that the affidavit
filed for the purpose of opening up the judgment obtained by
confession was insufficient, a view concurred in by all.
In Armstrong v. Zounis,6 the court reviews the authorities and clarifies the distinction between the general or retaining lien of an attorney and his special or charging lien.
The client had given the complainants two master's deeds
with the understanding that they should keep them until certain legal fees had been paid. Upon the client's failure to
make payment, the plaintiffs filed suit to foreclose their lien,
and the lower court so decreed. Holding the lien to be merely a retaining lien, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment.
The agency problem involved in Trust Company of Chicago v. Jackson Park Building Corporation7 is that of the
fiduciary and the extra profit. A trustee under a bond issue
had bought in the property at foreclosure. In its decree, the
court had specifically retained jurisdiction "until the bondholders receive their pro-rata share in cash or other security
to be approved by this court." A three man bondholders' protective committee "was organized"-precisely how does not
appear-one member of whom was a licensed real estate
broker. This broker opposed the approval of a sale arranged
38 304 IM. App. 537, 26 N.E. (2d) 670 (1940).
37 303 IH. App. 531, 25 N.E. (2d) 616 (1940).
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by the trustee and subsequently himself obtained a purchaser
at a higher figure. The question is whether or not his fiduciary relationship precludes him from receiving the customary
commission for his services as a broker. The Appellate Court
resolved this question in favor of the broker with the following terse comment:
However, the court, in deciding that Henriksen was entitled to the
commission, knew of his position as a member of the Bondholders' Protective Committee. There was no concealment of that fact. He was a
licensed real estate broker, and if there was a full disclosure and an
understanding that despite his position as a member of the committee, he
would be allowed a commission if he were successful in procuring a purchaser whose bid was acceptable to the court, it would be proper to allow
him a commission for his services.

Upon the face of it this seems fair enough. With whom, however, was the "understanding" and "full disclosure"? Certainly not with the trustee, who apparently opposed the brokers activity consistently from the beginning. Certainly not
with the bondholders, who appeared only through the committee of whom the broker was a representative and through
the trustee. If with anyone, it was with the court itself. At
the outset, in view of the limitation placed by the Supreme
Court in the Bryn Mawr case 8 on the power of the chancellor
to approve a plan of reorganization, i. e., seemingly solely
for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the bid at the
master's sale, in the instant case consummated long before,
it is somewhat startling to find the chancellor retaining supervision and control of the whole proceeding and finally
holding the sale himself. Conceding that in the present case
the opportunity of earning a sizable commission would not
influence the fiduciary judgment of the broker, and that in
opposing the approval of the previous sale he was considering solely the interests of the bondholders and not the possibility that he personally might profit should he be fortunate
enough to find a purchaser, and conceding further that after
obtaining his own purchasers he would not use his position as
a member of the committee to discourage the interest of
prospective purchasers represented by other brokers, and
38 First National Bank of Chicago v. Bryn Mawr Beach Bldg. Corp., 365 Ill. 409,
6 N.E. (2d) 654 (1937). See also Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robin, 361 Ill. 261,
198 N.E. 4 (1935).
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overlooking the fact that one of the broker-fiduciary's purchasers was an attorney who was active in the proceeding
and was incidentally allowed a $1,500 fee for services, one is
still reminded of the resolute language of the late Justice
Cardozo:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions.
... Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level
higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered
39
by any judgment of this court.

Labor Law
After having twice denied certiorari, ° the Supreme
Court of the United States, on June, 3, 1940, reversed its position and granted certiorari in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of
Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.41 It also reversed an
earlier ruling 42 and granted certiorari in the Swing case.4"
This raises the interesting constitutional question of whether
enjoining picketing with printed banners constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of speech where the persons enjoined are not employees of the petitioner and no labor dispute exists. Meanwhile the doctrine of the Swing and Meadowmoor cases has been followed in numerous Appellate
Court decisions.4 4
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1 (1928).
60 S. Ct. 128 (1940); 60 S. Ct. 295 (1940).
41 60 S. Ct. 1092 (1940.
60 S. Ct. 514 (1939).
43 American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 60 S. Ct. 1081 (1940). See 18 CHICAGOKENT LAW REviEw 18.
44 Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 301 Inl. App.
607, 22 N.E. (2d) 962 (1939); Hendrickson Motor Truck Co. v. International Association of Machinists, 301 Ill. App. 608, 22 N.E. (2d) 969 (1939); Jaffe v. Auto
Mechanics Local No. 1049, 301 Ill. App. 624, 22 N.E. (2d) 723 (1939); 2063 Lawrence
39
40
42

Avenue Building Corporation v. Van Heck, 305 Ill. App. 486, 27 N.E. (2d) 478
(1940). Compare decisions under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. A. 101 et
seq. as to what constitutes a labor dispute, e.g., New Negro Alliance v. Grocery
Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 S. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 1012 (1938). Compare Lake Valley Farm
Products Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 108 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939). Cert. granted, 60 S. Ct. 723 (April 1, 1940). The probabilities of differ-
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An injunction against peaceful picketing was denied in
Ritholz v. Andert, 5 where a labor dispute was found to
exist. Two points of particular interest appeared in the case.
First was the effect of an attempt by the employer to avoid
the Anti-Injunction Act" through a sale of his factory. This
the court regarded as a sham.4 7 Second was the effect of the
change of affiliation from A.F. of L. to C.I.O. of the men
having a union contract with the employer which apparently
was in effect. The court said that the change "was not a
matter that concerned the parties." The novelty of this second point raises many speculations.4 8
An order of the trial court issuing a temporary injunction against union activities was properly reversed by the
Appellate Court in Brandt v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of
Chicago,4 9 where the trial court had based its order on evidence introduced by the plaintiff in an ex parte proceeding
without giving the defendants an opportunity to deny the
charges made. 50
Workmen's Compensation
The constitutionality of Section 25 of the Workmen's
Occupational Disease Act was attacked in Liberty Foundries
Company v. Industrial Commission,"1 and collaterally or secondarily, the sufficiency of the evidence to establish liability
was questioned. Objections were made to Section 25, which
provides that an employee shall be deemed conclusively to
have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazards of
ence in relief, depending upon whether a state or federal forum is selected still
exists in labor cases in spite of the decisions in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938) and Ruhlin v.
New York Life Insurance Co., 304 U. S. 202, 58 S. Ct. 860, 82 L. Ed. 1290 (1938).
45 303 Ill. App. 61, 24 N.E. (2d) 586 (1940).
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 2a.
47 Compare Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 292 N. Y. S. 898 (1936), dealing
with the "runaway shop" problem.
48 At least where the powers of unions under C.I.O. might be different from
that under A. F. of L., the court's statement seems questionable. Also to be considered is the doctrine of nonassignability of contracts for personal service.

49 304 Ill. App. 578, 26 N.E. (2d) 643 (1940).
50 For the effect of indiscriminate issuance of injunctions without fair hearings,
see Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction, passim.
51 373 IM. 146, 25 N.E. (2d) 790 (1940).
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the disease exist. Further provisions placed liability on the
employer in whose service the employee was last exposed,
except that as to silicosis and asbestiosis the only employer
liable is the last employer, and exposure must have occurred
during sixty days or more after the effective date of the act.
The court held that Section 25 must be construed with Section 6, and that exposure to the hazards does not establish
the disease, nor its necessary connection with the employment, nor does it establish liability, and that therefore the
provision is not in violation of Article 2 of the Constitution.
Moreover, when employer and employee elect to come under the act, the sections of the act become a part of the
contract of employment, and rights guaranteed by the due
process clause are waived by electing to come within the
compensation provisions of the law.52
An interesting case was carried through the Appellate
to the Supreme Court of this state in Kijowski v. Times
Publishing Corporation." The driver of a newspaper delivery truck hired a minor to assist him in counting, binding
and delivering papers on a route. The minor helper was
paid by the driver, who was not reimbursed by the corporate defendant. The minor was injured by the negligence of
the driver, and a common-law action was started, in which it
was claimed that the helper was not bound by the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. This position was sustained by the Supreme Court, where it was held that through
the driver as agent, the principal could be reached for the
imposition of common law liability, although the principal
could not be heard to say that thorough knowledge of the
driver's practice, and acquiescence therein the minor had
become its employee and subject to the act. Similar cases in
other jurisdictions, differently decided, were distinguished,
54
but not without some difficulty.
Agar Packing & Provision Company v. Becker,5 5 a case
of novelty and of importance, was decided in the Appellate
52 Citing Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 77, 115 N.E.
822
(1917), and Booth Fisheries v. Industrial Commission, 271 U.S. 208, 46 S.Ct. 491, 70
L.Ed. 908 (1926).

53 298 Ill. App. 236, 18 N.E. (2d) 754 (1939), noted in 17 CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIW

295; 372 Ill. 311, 23 N.E. (2d) 703 (1939), noted in 28 IMl. B.J. 300.
54 See note, 28 Ill. B. J. 300.
55 301 Ill. App. 237, 22 N.E. (2d) 447 (1939).
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Court. An employee amenable to the Compensation Act was
killed while driving in his automobile, through the negligence of a farmer, a member of a class expressly excluded
from the act. Compensation was voluntarily paid to the sole
dependent by the employer, who then filed suit in his own
name against the farmer claiming subrogation under Section 29. The trial court dismissed the suit on motion of the
defendant, and the Appellate Court sustained the dismissal.
The opinion stated that the statute which gives the employer
the right to maintain the suit against such "third party"
limits the "third party" defendants to those mentioned in
Section 29, and, since the defendant farmer is expressly exempted from the operation of the statute, the suit will not
lie. The Wrongful Death Act was said to bar any action by
anyone other than those mentioned in its own provisions.
Since the action could not be predicated on the Wrongful
Death Act, nor on the provisions of the Compensation Act,
no remedy is available to the employer. It is still an open
question as to whether the Supreme Court will sustain this
view if and when such a case reaches it. 56
FAMILY

The validity of a marriage contracted in Indiana, by
residents of Illinois, in an effort to avoid the provisions of
the so-called Saltiel Act, 57 requiring proof of freedom from
venereal disease, was considered in Boysen v. Boysen,5 8
where the plaintiff sought an annulment on the ground that
such marriage, being in violation of the provisions of the
Uniform Marriage Evasion Act,59 was void. The court properly pointed out that since the only penalty for violation of
the act in question was one imposed on the clerk who issued
the license, such marriage, even if it had occurred in Illinois,
would have been valid; therefore annulment could not be
granted, and the intent of the parties in going to Indiana was
of no consequence.
The constitutionality of an act passed in 1933 terminating
56
57
58
206,
59

See note, 18 CHICAG-KENT LAw REVIEw 117.
IlM.Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 6a.
301 Ill. App. 573, 23 N.E. (2d) 231 (1939). Notes, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW
34 IU. L. Rev. 872.
li. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 19.
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alimony payments upon remarriage of the recipient thereof6"
was challenged in Adler v. Adler,61 but upheld. In that case
the parties were divorced in 1922. The decree approved an
alimony settlement by which a trust was created to provide
monthly payments for the plaintiff for the remainder of her
lifetime, further provided that remarriage of the plaintiff
should not operate as a release, and ordered the defendant to
comply with such settlement. In 1936 the defendant applied
for modification thereof on the basis of the plaintiff's subsequent remarriage. Such relief was granted, the court finding (1) that the settlement was not an alimony settlement in
gross and so was subject to modification, 2 and (2) that the
legislature was free to regulate the payment of periodic alimony, although, of course, only so far as installments which
had not yet accrued were concerned. The agreement of the
parties to pay despite remarriage was held a nullity on the
ground that it would oust the court of its power to amend
its own decrees if enforced.
An unusual complaint by a wife seeking to have a Nevada decree of divorce secured by her husband declared null
and void, was filed in the Circuit Court of Champaign
County. The trial court dismissed the suit for want of equity.
On appeal,6 3 the cause was reversed and remanded with
direction to enter a decree in favor of the complainant for
the relief prayed for, the Appellate Court finding as a fact
that defendant was not a bona fide resident of Nevada at
the time of the alleged divorce and that he had procured it
by fraud and deception. No doubt the court was right in its
finding as to the facts, but the nature of the proceeding
arouses interest. The validity of the alleged earlier divorce
is usually tested in either a suit to secure separate maintenance, or for an absolute divorce, or for an annulment of
a subsequently contracted marriage, at which time such
decree is offered as a defense.6 4 In the instant case the
60 Laws, 1933, p. 490; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 40, § 19.
61 373 Il1. 361, 26 N.E. (2d) 504 (1940).
Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N.E. 820 (1925). If the agreement had not
become incorporated in the decree, modification would have been improper. Smith
v. Johnson, 321 Ill. 134, 151 N.E. 550 (1926).
63 Grein v. Grein, 303 Ill. App. 398, 25 N.E. (2d) 409 (1940), leave to appeal dismissed, 28 N.E. (2d) Adv. Sheet No. 10, pink sheet, II.
64 As to separate maintenance, see Janssen v. Janssen, 269 111. App. 233 (1933);
62
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question was apparently presented by asking for a declaratory judgment as to the effect of the Nevada decree-an unusual action in Illinois, which neither court nor counsel appears to have questioned. 5
Notice was previously taken herein of an order of an
Illinois court in habeas corpus proceedings providing for
the division of custody of a child between the parent and
grandparents.6 6 The Supreme Court, by reversing such
order,67 has removed all doubt that the parental right to
the care and custody of his child is exclusive, unless the
parent has forfeited such right. The status of children was
also considered in Brainard v. Brainard,6 in which certain
illegitimate children claimed they had become legitimated
by virtue of the Illinois Revised Statutes of 1939, Chapter 89,
Section 17a. It was admitted that the father had acknowledged
them as his children and had held their mother out as his
wife, but the court disbelieved the evidence tending to prove
an intermarriage between the parents. Lacking such proof,
the court held the children had not become legitimate inasmuch as the statute in question had not been complied with in
its most vital aspect. The court refused to enter into a discussion of the constitutionality of the statute, which was
treated as being beside the point on the facts before it. 69
for absolute divorce, see Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N.E. 841 (1896); as
to annulment, see Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N.E. (2d) 645 (1937).
65 In the absence of statutes authorizing the courts to pronounce declaratory
judgments, the general rule appears to be that courts should act only to grant
corrective relief: Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U. S. 274, 48 S.
Ct. 507, 72 L. Ed. 880 (1928); Prather v. Lewis, 287 Ill. 304, 122 N.E. 470 (1919).
See also 87 A.L.R. 1205; 16 Am. Jur. 273.
66 People ex rel. Whalen v. Sheehan, 300 Il. App. 228, 20 N.E. (2d) 809 (1939).
See 18 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 18, note 84.
67 People v. Sheehan, 373 Ill. 79, 25 N.E. (2d) 502 (1940).
68 373 Ill. 459, 26 N.E. (2d) 856 (1940.
69 From an examination of the briefs it appears that appellee had contended the
act in question was unconstitutional because it purported to amend the Marriage
Act, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1939, Ch. 89, whereas the purpose of the statute was to endow
such children, otherwise illegitimate, with the ability to inherit from the father
and should, therefor, be amendatory of the Descent Act, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1939, Ch.
39. Appellant relied on Prescott v. Ayers, 276 Ill. 242, 114 N.E. 557 (1916), which
held constitutional Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 18, relating to slave marriages
and the legitimacy of offspring therefrom. The court appears to have followed
the appellee's contention in its initial opinion and held the act unconstitutional.
See petition for rehearing, answer thereto, and reply to such answer. On rehearing, the decision passed on the grounds above noted, the initial opinion apparently
having been withdrawn.
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One other case, that of Usalatz v. Estate of John

Pleshe,71 is of consequence. There the claimant, a woman,
sought to recover from the estate of the decedent as on an
implied contract for the value of the services she rendered
deceased during his lifetime while living with him as his
wife "under the mistaken belief that she was his wife, he
knowing that she was not, and voluntarily accepting such
services."
There was no showing that any purported
ceremony had been performed, nor had decedent been guilty
of any fraud in inducing the relationship. It was held that
no implied contract to pay the value of such services could
be predicated on such illicit relationship; hence, the claim
was dismissed.
PROPERTY
TRUSTS

A wide range of problems of trust law from creation to
termination of trusts came before the Illinois reviewing
courts during the past year. Most of the decisions presented
merely routine applications of well-settled principles. One or
two cases which present novel questions in Illinois and several cases which reinforce the doctrines of older decisions
deserve to be mentioned.
The legal effects of a provision in a will directing a
trustee to expend funds to erect a cemetery monument were
passed upon in Kingsley v. Montrose Cemetery Company,7 1
apparently for the first time in this state. The will in question
directed that certain funds be paid to the cemetery company
in trust to use the income for the perpetual care of a burial
lot and the monument to be erected upon it. The testatrix
then provided that the remainder of her estate be paid to a
designated corporate trustee to be used in the construction of
the monument, with provision for the payment of any residue
to a relative of the testatrix. The named trustee declined the
trust and the ultimate residuary legatee filed a complaint
for the construction of the will contending that the bequest
of funds to the cemetery company for the care of the lot and
monument was invalidated by reason of a perpetual care
70 302 IMl. App. 392, 23 N.E. (2d) 939 (1939).
71

304 Ill. App. 273, 26 N.E. (2d) 613 (1940).
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agreement entered into between the testatrix and the company some time before her death. The cemetery company
filed an answer and a counterclaim in which it presented the
novel contention that it was a beneficiary of the trust for the
constuction of the monument and praying for the appointment of a trustee to carry the trust into effect. The court
ruled that the interest of the company was not that of a beneficiary, as the advantages it would derive were merely incidental to the main objectives of the trust.7 2 It was further
held that a valid trust was not created since there was no
definite beneficiary capable of enforcing the trust. Seemingly, this decision rejects the doctrine of the so-called "honorary trust, ' 7 although the point is not discussed in detail in
the opinion. The court decided, however, that such a provision for a monument might be valid as a direction to the
personal representative to pay funeral expenses, but that
this was a question for the probate court. The cemetery company and the plaintiff were allowed attorney's fees under
the rule that, where the testator expresses his intent so ambiguously as to create a difficulty which makes it necessary
to go into a court of chancery for a construction of the will,
the costs of the litigation must be borne by the estate.
Two other cases involving problems of the creation of
trusts should be mentioned. One of these presents a situation of a type frequently occurring in the reports, wherein
the absence of legal advice has proved costly to laymen
who are not familiar with the essentials of the trust device.
In 1927 a business transaction was closed by a woman with
the assistance of her friend, a real estate man. The large
sum of money which was paid to her she allowed to remain
in the hands of the real estate man, who paid her interest
semi-annually on the balances in his hands. In 1930, after several withdrawals, a balance of $13,000 remained and receipt
was given by the friend reciting that the funds were in his
hands for the purchase of "first mortgage on property in
Chicago. ' 74 He continued to pay interest at 6 percent until
72
73

74

Restatement of Trusts, § 126.
See Restatement of Trusts, § 124, comments c and d.
"Chicago, Ill.,
Mar. 18, 1930.
"Received of Margaret Schaack Thirteen Thousand Dollars for purchase
of First Mortgage on property in Chicago, Ill., Chicago, Cook County, Illinois.
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March 27, 1936. After his death, a fifth class claim was asserted against his estate on the theory that the money was
held in trust. The estate was insolvent. The probate court
allowed the claim as a fifth class claim and was reversed
by the Appellate Court.7 5 The Supreme Court divided, the
majority holding that the money was not held in trust and
that the facts presented merely a sixth class claim. In the
opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy chief reliance was placed
upon the absence of any evidence of intention to create a
true trust. It was said that the original transaction amounted
to no more than a loan and that nothing was done subsequently to change the nature of the transaction. The dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Gunn, concurred in by Mr. Justice
Jones and Mr. Justice Farthing, took the position that the receipt contained all the necessary elements of a valid trust.
The decision in the case seems clearly right. Strangly, neither opinion discusses the fact that the deceased paid interest
on the balance in his hands regularly until 1936. Apparently,
the deceased was expected to pay interest from his own
funds at a fixed rate and not merely such interest as the
funds might earn. Payment of interest imports a loan, not a
trust. 76 If the original transaction was therefore stamped
with the character of a loan, the position of the dissenting
judges is not tenable since the facts do not indicate any
material change in the character of the relationship down
to the time of deceased's death. Such transactions are frequently met with and it often appears that the claimant enters into such an arrangement through lack of understanding
of the technical difference between a true trust of money
and a loan to someone in whom the claimant reposes a broad
confidence.
Albers v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Fraternity""presented a
situation in which the fraternity treasurer deposited funds
This receipt must be surrendered when said papers are delivered. $13,000.00.
(signed) Joseph J. Reiter."
A similar receipt for a larger amount was surrendered when this receipt
was given.
75 Schaack v. Reiter, 372 II. 328, 23 N.E. (2d) 714 (1939).
76 Pittsburgh National Bank of Commerce v. McMurray, 98 Pa. St. 538 (1881);
Wetherell v. O'Brien, 140 Ill. 146 (1892); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Puritan Motors
Corp., 244 Mass. 259, 138 N.E. 321 (1923).
77 304 Ill.
App. 238, 26 N.E. (2d) 156 (1940).
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from the sale of securities in the bank in which he was employed, taking certificates of deposit in the usual form. These
were paid in full when the bank failed to open after the moratorium, on the theory that the funds were held in trust. The
Appellate Court decided that this was an unlawful preference
in view of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish any
agreement on the part of the bank to segregate the funds.
The Supreme Court handed down one decision during the
year which is of importance as indicating the position of the
court on the question of whether it is proper in the absence of
any provision in the trust instrument for a trustee to purchase trust investments from a company or organization
with which the trustee is affiliated. In Kinney v. Lindgren"
two individual trustees bought bonds from the corporation of
which they were the principal officers. The court, citing
Section 170 of the Restatement of Trusts, held that a trustee,
in the absence of any provision in the trust instrument, cannot purchase investments for the trust from a company in
which he has a substantial interest or is a principal officer.
Good faith and the consideration paid were said to be immaterial. This seems to be the first direct ruling on this question in this state.
Litigation over trust investments as an aftermath of the
economic depression is still active. The recent Appellate
Court case of In re Sanders' Estate79 again presents the
difficult problem of considering in retrospect the conduct of
a trustee in making investments and of endeavoring to reconstruct the background against which his conduct must be
viewed. In this case the trust instrument contained a rather
unusual investment clause: "To invest the same as to the
said trustee shall seem proper, in Government bonds, first
farm mortgages or other equally good securities. . . ." It
was provided that the trustee should make a report to the
court at least once every two years. The income from the
trust res was to be used for the support of the minor daughter of the settlor with discretion to use the principal. At the
time of the creation of the trust, the res consisted of a small
amount of cash and a $16,000 note secured by a first mort78
79

373 i1. 415, 26 N.E. (2d) 471 (1940).
304 Ill. App. 57, 25 N.E. (2d) 923 (1940).
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gage on farm property. This note was paid when due, and
the trustee bought six per cent first mortgage bonds on Chicago real estate, on which real estate a hotel building was
in process of construction. The bonds were purchased on
the advice of an officer of the bank wherein the trustee was
employed and the agent of the securities firm from whom
the bonds were purchased. The trustee charged the trust estate with the price of the bonds at par, but the evidence indicated that the actual price which he paid for them was 96.
In 1930 one bond was paid and the trustee bought another real
estate bond on Chicago property. From 1931 to 1938 the trustee made no report. In the latter year, when the trust was
ready for termination, he filed a report showing $47.31 on
hand plus certificates issued in reorganization proceedings
of the two properties securing the bonds which he had purchased. The court sustained objections by the beneficiary
and surcharged the trustee with the principal and interest at
the rate of 5 per cent. The Appellate Court affirmed the surcharge but reduced the interest rate to 3 per cent, as more
nearly approximating the normal rate of return. The opinion found that the trustee was remiss in not following the directions of the settlor to invest in securities equal in grade to
government bonds or first mortgages on farm properties. The
trustee did not make the proper personal investigation at
the time the investments were made, nor did he exert the
vigilance which his duty required. The opinion indicates
also that the trustee should have diversified the investments,
instead of investing almost the entire trust fund in one issue
of real estate bonds. In view of these facts and the additional
evidence that the trustee made a secret profit on the first
purchase of bonds, the decision is clearly right. However,
the opinion suggests that the trustee violated his instructions
in investing in real estate bonds because these were not a
proper type of investment under the language of the investment clause. This conclusion does not appear to be sound
in view of the position of the Supreme Court of Illinois in regard to the propriety of a trustee's investing in participating interests in real estate mortgages. 0 Some real estate
80 In the Matter of Estates of Lalla, 362 IRl. 621, 1 N.E. (2d) 50 (1936); In re
Guardianship of Lutz, 362 Ill. 631, 1 N.E. (2d) 55 (1936).
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bonds might reasonably have been considered quite as good
investments as farm mortgages in 1927.
The insulation provided for trust funds by Section 49 of
the Chancery Act s' against attack by creditors of the beneficiary was alluded to in the case of Hurst v. American State
Bank."' It was held that a vested remainder in the principal
of a trust fund could be reached by creditor's bill, although
the interest of a beneficiary was immune. Even though the
interest of the remainderman could be sold before the termination of the trust this could not affect the trust res. The
confused situation as to the rights of creditors of the beneficiary requires extensive re-examination of statutory and
equitable remedies.
Two cases dealt with the problems involved in the termination of trusts. In Sutliff v. Aydelott, 8' the court applied
to an unusual situation the rule that where all parties are
capable of acting they can compel the termination of the
trust although its objects are not accomplished.8 4 In this
case certain real estate was transferred to trustees to apply
all net income to the use and benefit of the grantors "share
and share alike, and the heirs of each of them. . . ." Certain
personal property was likewise transferred to the trustees to
hold during the lives of the grantors and the life of the survivor of them and when within a reasonable time after the
death of the survivor to convey to the heirs at law. It was
said that the word "heirs" was a term of limitation in the
case of the real property. Therefore, all the grantors being
sui juris, they could terminate the trust. It was pointed out
that the trust was "executory" as to the personalty since
the trustees were required to convey after the death of the
survivor. Therefore, children of the grantors acquired interests in the trust res. Moreover, the rule in Shelley's Case
could not be applied to personalty.
8 ' specific
In Friese v. Friese,
directions of the settlor as
to the termination of the trust were considered mandatory,
as against a contention that they were merely directory. The
court relied upon Section 334 of the Restatement of Trusts.
81 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 23, §
83 373 Ill. 633, 27 N.E. (2d) 529
84 Burton v. Boren, 308 Ill. 440,
85 373 Il. 216, 25 N.E. (2d) 788

49.
82 303 Ill. App. 314, 25 N.E. (2d) 85 (1940).
(1940).
139 N.E. 868 (1923).
(1940).
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Finally the courts passed upon some problems of the law
of charitable trusts in three cases which deserve mention.
In two of these cases the problem of the proper application of
the cy pres doctrine was examined. In one case s ( the testator made a bequest to the Chicago Daily News Fresh Air
Fund which declined to accept, since it had decided to discontinue its operations. In proceedings to determine the
proper disposition of the bequest, the Attorney General contended that the fund should be applied to some other charity
of similar purposes. The court was unable to find a "general
charitable intent" from the fact that property was disposed
of to a charitable organization designated by name and correctly held the cy pres doctrine inapplicable. Reliance was
87
placed upon the well-known case of Quimby v. Quimby.
The Supreme Court held proper a decree ordering a sale of
certain lots deeded to a city for school purposes "for the use
of the inhabitants of School District No. Two," where the
funds were to be used for school purposes in the area formerly included in the school district specified. 8 In an interesting opinion the court held charitable a trust to provide for
"practical scientific research work in horticulture and agriculture" through the establishment of an outdoor museum
89
where trees and plants could be examined and studied.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

While an executor under a prior will may be a proper
party to contest a later will and may either resort to an appeal from admission to probate or may file a bill in the circuit
court to contest the later will,90 he may not use these remedies cumulatively when the decision in the first case results
from a finding that the executor is not in fact an interested
person, and no appeal is taken from such decision. So held
the Appellate Court in In re Estate of Hills.91 In the previous
cases where an executor under a prior will has been treated
86 Chicago Daily News Fresh Air Fund v. Kerner, 305 Ill. App. 237, 27 N.E. (2d)
310 (1940).
87 175 Ill. App. 367 (1912).
88 Board of Education of City of Rockford v. City of Rockford, 372 Il. 442, 24
N.E. (2d) 366 (1939).
89 People v. Morton, 373 Ill. 72, 25 N.E. (2d) 504 (1940).
90 O'Brien v. Bonfield, 220 Ili. 219, 77 N.E. 167 (1906).
91305 Ill. App. 193, 27 N.E. (2d) 324 (1940).
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as a proper person to contest a later will, the prior will would
have been extant but for the later will. In the case at hand
the circuit court had found on proceedings to contest the
later will that the first will had been destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke and therefore that the executor
named therein was not an interested person. Although it was
averred later to have been found and filed, the executor thereunder did not thereby acquire a right to appeal from the admission to probate of the later will as long as the decision
in the contest case, finding the earlier will to have been revoked, still stood unchallenged.
The Appellate Court held that an attorney for an executor who has applied to the probate court to fix a reasonable
attorney's fee and to have the same allowed out of the estate
will be precluded by the order of the probate court which
fixes the fee and finds that it has been paid in full from
thereafter claiming in a suit against the executor individually that the amount fixed by the probate court was not reasonable and that he is entitled to a further sum. 2 The court
said,
where an attorney intends to hold an executor or administrator personally responsible for his fee, good faith toward the client would seem to
dictate that the attorney should so inform the client at the time the
latter seeks his services.

The last statement is somewhat broader than was necessary to the decision, which considered not merely the conduct of the attorney at the time he was employed but also
the attorney's conduct after the services were rendered, indicating an intent to look to the estate for payment. But
broad statements are sometimes perpetuated in the form of
decision. Should this happen here, we may find that because
it is customary for an attorney to look to the estate for payment, it will be presumed that he enters into the contract on
that understanding unless he exhibits to his client a contrary
intention.
The case of Allen v. Beemer93 presents some unusual
angles regarding revocation of wills and appears to be the
first decision in Illinois concerning the peculiar points in92 Rubinkam v. MacArthur, 302 Ill. App. 71, 23 N.E. (2d) 348 (1939).
93 372 Il. 295, 23 N.E. (2d) 724 (1939). Note, 28 Ill. B.J. 245.
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volved. Benjamin F. Beemer lived in Iowa and owned a farm
in Illinois. May 22, 1928, he made a will in Illinois and limited
the effect of the instrument to property within this state. A
month later, at his home in Iowa, he executed another will
which disposed of his personal estate and his Iowa realty.
The second will purported to revoke "any and all former
wills." In a long and well-reasoned opinion, Justice Shaw
held that it was not the intention of the testator to revoke the
Illinois will, inasmuch as the Iowa will did not purport to affect the Illinois farm. The court also called attention to the
fact that the two instruments when read together showed a
plan to give the Illinois farm to the testator's son and his
son's children and to give the Iowa farm to his daughter and
her children. In the words of Justice Shaw:
The two wills not only fail to overlap in any respect, but actually come
together and join in a perfectly harmonious whole, and when so joined
present a completely harmonious, just and reasonable distribution of
his estate among the natural objects of his bounty. Taken together they
provide fully for his wife, equally for his children, and reasonably per
stirpes for his grand-children. The Iowa will, alone, produces no such
result.

The provisions of the statutes regarding revocation of
wills is mandatory, and neither a signed written instruction
of the testatrix to her attorney, who had the will in his custody, to destroy the will, nor his subsequent act of destroying it could operate to revoke the will, according to In re
Estate of Mitchell.94 The written instruction could not serve
to revoke the will because it was not itself executed with the
formality of a will, and the destruction was not in the presence of the testatrix as required by the statute.
A presumption of undue influence may arise from the
fact that one who benefits largely by the provisions of a will
gave a lawyer the directions for drafting the will, especially
where others of equal degree of relationship, who were not
present when the will was executed, did not receive equal
benefits, in spite of the fact that the principal beneficiary
himself was not present at the time of the execution of the
will. This would seem to be the gist of the ruling in Sulzberger v. Sulzberger"' in so far as it dealt with undue influ94 305 I1. App. 289, 27 N.E. (2d) 606 (1940).
95 372 IMl. 240, 23 N.E. (2d) 46 (1939).
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ence. The principal beneficiary in the case was a brother,
Bertram, who received one-third in fee and the remainder
after the expiration of life estates which another brother and
a sister took equally in the other two-thirds. Bertram had
lived with the decedent up to the time when the former was
married, and then had lived on adjoining property, exchanging work with the decedent. His sons had also worked for
the decedent. No special confidential relation was shown to
have existed. It is not impossible for the jury to have found
undue influence as a fact; however, to say that a presumption existed is to modify the requirements heretofore believed
to have been necessary to raise such a presumption. 6 And
if the decision had depended alone on the finding of undue influence, it might well have proved startling; but the will was
attacked also on the ground of mental incapacity, and there
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found
such incapacity. It might have been more proper to say that
the facts from which the court presumed undue influence,
namely, a mind weakened by suffering and physical debilitation, an unequal provision for the natural objects of the
testator's bounty, a will, the terms of which were dictated by
the principal beneficiary according to alleged instructions
from a testator who appeared physically and mentally incapable of giving instructions, would rather be such as would
strengthen the belief of mental incapacity rather than raise
a presumption of undue influence.
A clear case on the subject of partial revocation is found
in Board of National Missions of the PresbyterianChurch v.
Sherry,9 where interlineations and deletions were held not
to effect a cancellation, although the envelope containing the
will bore the notation: "August 1st, 1938. The enclosed will
not to be executed Kate Bennett."
MORTGAGES

A number of interesting mortgage cases came up for
hearing in the Supreme and Appellate Courts this year.
Most of the following were decided in accord with well established principles, but there was presented in many of
96 See 28 IRI. B.J. 218 and citations there given.
97 372 Ill. 272, 23 N.E. (2d) 730 (1939).
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them some new fact or theory which makes them well
worth noting.
Adverse claims to the rents collected by the receiver
appointed in the foreclosure proceedings occur frequently.
Ordinarily the mortgagee secures his right to rents during
the redemption period by obtaining a deficiency decree and
98
continuing the receiver in possession. In Liss v. Harris,
however, the mortgagee had secured the appointment of a
receiver but had failed to obtain a deficiency decree, although a deficiency had been found due in the master's
report. The mortgage in this case had pledged the rent, but
the petitioners, assignees of the equity of redemption, claimed that this pledge was only a right to a lien which required
the entry of a deficiency decree to mature it. The court, in
line with previous decisions, stated that the pledge constituted an existing lien to the extent of the deficiency and was
not dependent upon a decree.9 9 The rents in the hands of
the receiver were, therefore, delivered to the mortgagee.
The court stated further that it is not necessary that a deficiency decree be entered at any special time and that one
maye be entered even after the expiration of the period of
redemption.
After expiration of the redemption period the holder of
the master's certificate frequently fails to apply for his deed
and, although under the statute and decisions he has a period
of five years to secure one, he does not, meanwhile, have a
title to the premises.100 In Clark v. Hall,10 ' the mortgagee
had bid at the sale, secured a deficiency decree, continued
the receiver in possession, and then had held his certificate
to almost the last day of its validity. In the meantime the
receiver had collected rents, and at the time the master's
98 304 Ill. App. 173, 26 N.E. (2d) 133 (1940).
99 Fidelity Trust & Savings Bank v. Ahlgrim, 278 Ill. App. 147 (1934); Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Suter, 287 Ill. App. 162, 4 N.E. (2d) 650 (1936); Owsley v.
Neeves, 179 Ill. App. 61 (1913); Shinnick v. Goodman, 259 Ill. App. 107 (1930).
100 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 31: "When the premises mentioned in any such
certificate shall not be redeemed in pursuance of law, the legal holder of such
certificate shall be entitled to a deed therefor at any time within five years from
the expiration of the time of redemption ....
When such deed is not taken within
the time limited by this Act, the certificate of purchase shall be null and void ......
See also Strauss v. Tuckhorn, 200 Ill. 75, 65 N.E. 683 (1902); Hack v. Snow, 338
Ill. 28, 169 N.E. 819 (1930); Klein v. Mangan, 369 Ill. 645, 17 N.E. (2d) 958 (1938).
101 303 Ill. App. 1, 24 N.E. (2d) 394 (1939).
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deed was issued had a balance on hand. The lower court ordered the entire balance to be applied against the deficiency
decree. On appeal it was held that the right to rents ceased
at the expiration of the redemption period, and that the
rights of the mortgagee for the unpaid balance on the deficiency decree were only those of a common creditor.
0 2 involves pertinent questions concernHarper v. Sallee"
ing both rent and redemption. In this case the second mortgagee had answered the complaint to foreclose a first mortgage and had proven up his second mortgage. After sale, the
second mortgagee redeemed on the last day of the twelvemonth period but did not proceed to sale under his junior
decree, claiming instead the right to title under the redemption. The second mortgage had not pledged the rents but
the mortgagee went into possession. The court pointed out
that since this was a redemption within the twelve-month
10 3
it
period and therefore only extinguished the first lien,
did not offer the means of transferring title. Therefore, no
title interest accrued to the second mortgagee until he had
proceeded to sale and perfected it pursuant to statute, and
the unpledged rents belonged to the owner of the equity of
redemption.
Redemption by a judgment creditor resulted in an interesting decision in the case of Hruby v. Steinman,"' wherein the bondholders' committee had made the mistake of
bidding in the property at an unusually low price. The judgment creditor sought to redeem under two judgments, one
against each of the co-owners of the premises, and one of
which judgments was invalid. The bondholders' committee
sought to enjoin the redemption and to litigate the whole redemption procedure. They claimed among other things that
the creditor could not redeem the whole of the premises
under his one judgment against an undivided interest of one
co-owner. The court in this case pointed out that the real
interest of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale is to secure
the amount due him under his bid, and, if he wishes to protect himself, he must do so not by attacking the redemp305
Ill.
shall be
104 302
102
103

II. App. 85, 26 N.E. (2d) 987 (1940).
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 18: ". , . whereupon such sale and certificate
null and void."
Ill. App. 480, 24 N.E. (2d) 175 (1939).
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tioner but by the amount of his bid. The court stated that the
fact that the purchaser at the execution sale may or may
not receive a good title is no concern of the bidder at the
foreclosure sale. The judgment against the one co-owner
was held sufficient under the statute to redeem the whole of
the premises, the only requirement being that it be an actual
judgment recovered by the creditor within the prescribed
period. 10 5
Although the Illinois courts recognize the right of a mortgagee to pursue both his remedy at law and in equity against
the debtor or debtors until paid in full, a limitation on this
rule is indicated in Skolnik v. Petella.10 6 In the foreclosure
proceedings the mortgagee had failed to allege facts under
which he could have held liable the grantee who had assumed
the indebtedness, but the grantee had entered her appearance and could have been made subject to a deficiency
decree by proper amendment. The mortgagee had taken a
deficiency decree against the mortgagor and thereafter had
filed suit at law against the grantee. The court refused to
allow the subsequent suit at law, stating that the doctrine of
res judicata was applicable here and finding that the election to make either one of the debtors liable in the foreclosure proceedings was a choice that included the duty of
seeking the same remedy against all of the debtors before
the court. Therefore the mortgagee did not have the right to
harass the court and the defendant with another suit.
A similar question arose in First National Bank v.
Marks, °7 except that in this case the defendants, who were
sued at law, were guarantors who had been previously made
defendants in the foreclosure proceeding. The foreclosure
suit had been instituted before the Civil Practice Act became effective, and the mortgagee could not join third parties in an action of foreclosure for the purpose of obtaining
a deficiency against them.0 s Hence, it was held that the
election to make the mortgagor liable in the foreclosure proIll. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, §§ 25 and 26.
304 Ill. App. 331, 26 N.E. (2d) 646 (1940).
304 Ill.
App. 438, 26 N.E. (2d) 731 (1940).
Walsh v. Van Horn, 22 Ill. App. 170 (1887); Christensen v. Niedert, 259 IMI.
App. 96 (1930); Shiel v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 262 Ill. App. 410 (1931).
105
106
107
108
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ceedings could not affect the position of the guarantors, nor
could such proceedings be res judicata as to them.
Where mortgaged property is conveyed and the grantee
assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage indebtedness he
has entered into a contractual relationship involving both
the grantor and the mortgagee. The duty to perform must of
necessity arise from the promise, and if no promise has in
fact been made, either expressly or impliedly, the courts
have on a number of occasions refused to hold the grantee
liable merely because a covenant in the deed provided that
the grantee assumed and agreed to pay.'1 9 This is always a
question of fact. In Zamis v. Hanson,110 the determination
of this question of fact took an interesting turn when the
court held that, although the grantee had no knowledge of
either the deed or the assumption clause in the deed, she
became liable by ratification upon making a later conveyance. Title in this case was taken in the name of the grantee
by her husband, who was president of an investment company and dealt frequently in real estate transactions. Later
the husband, together with another member of the firm,
and the. grantee conveyed various properties, including the
one in question, to a trustee, who in turn issued beneficial
certificates of 200 shares to the husband, 110 shares to the
other member of the firm, and 90 to the defendant grantee.
This conveyance by the grantee to the trustee was held to
have constituted a ratification of the act of the husband in
procuring the original conveyance and to have estopped the
grantee from denying knowledge of the said assumption covenant. At the trial the grantee stated that she had no knowledge of either of these transactions. If this were actually
so,"" the rule enunciated would seem somewhat harsh.
Cases dealing with the amendment of decrees after term
time are always of interest to the practicing attorney. In
Dillinburg v. Hellgren,"2 through error, the decree in the
109 Merriman v. Schmitt, 211 Ill. 263, 71 N.E. 986 (1904); Ludlam v. Pinckard,
304 Ill. 449, 136 N.E. 725 (1922); Elser v. Williams, 104 Ill. App. 238 (1902).
110 302 Ill. App. 404, 24 N.E. (2d) 59 (1939).
111 It appeared from the opinion that although the defendant disclaimed knowledge, her statements were contradictory and did not follow the pleading which had
admitted knowledge.
See also Sutter v. Rose, 64 Ill. App. 263 (1896), affd. in 169 Ill. 66, 48 N.E. 411
(1897).
112 304 Il. App. 51, 25 N.E. (2d) 890 (1940).
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foreclosure proceeding was entered on December 20, 1933, in
conformity with the Judgment and Decrees Act of 1921
rather than with that of 1917, which it should have followed.
Pursuant to that decree the master sold the premises and,
after the expiration of fifteen months, issued a deed. In
October, 1936, the holder of the master's deed, upon petitioning for a writ of assistance, discovered the error and filed
a petition to amend, requesting a sale in accordance with
the act of 1917. It was held that this amendment was not
revisory or appellate and did not alter the substantive rights
of the parties, and it could therefore be made.
Whenever an action at law is followed by a foreclosure
the question of merger in the deficiency decree may be
important. In McDonald v. Culhane"3 the mortgagee discovered to his sorrow that his original judgment lien gave
way to a subsequent one because of just such a merger. In
this case the mortgagee held a note secured by collateral
notes, the payment of which latter were secured by mortgage. Judgment was confessed on the first note, and execution issued; thereafter the collateral notes were foreclosed,
and a deficiency decree was entered which included the
amount due under the first judgment. Execution was duly
had on this decree. Between the date of the original judgment and the deficiency decree, another creditor recovered
a judgment against the debtor, and it therefore became important in a partition suit to discover which lien was paramount. The court, after pointing out that the authorities are
divided on this question, adopted the view that the first
judgment became wholly merged in the decree, and, therefore, lost its character as a lien. This decision was aided by
the fact that the mortgagee himself had so treated his former judgment.
Section 1 of the Mechanics' Lien Law" 4 came up for
discussion in the case of Erickson v. Ginocchio,115 wherein
the mortgagor had entered into a contract for painting and
113 303 Ill. App. 101, 24 N.E. (2d) 737 (1940). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw
423.
114 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 82, § 1: "This lien shall extend to an estate in fee,
for life, for years, or any other estate on any right of redemption, or other interest
which such owner may have in the lot or tract of land at the time of making such
contract ....
"
115 303 Ill. App. 159, 24 N.E. (2d) 884 (1940).
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decorating the premises after foreclosure and sale had been
had. It was contended that under Illinois law the mortgagor,
as owner of the equity of redemption, had the same estate in
the premises before and after sale and that such an estate
was subject to the lien under Section 1.116 The court held,
however, that the interest of the mortgagor in the equity of
redemption before sale was distinct from the statutory right
to redeem and that the Mechanics' Lien Law referred to the
equity of redemption. The statutory right to redeem is,
therefore, not a sufficient interest to support a mechanic's
lien.
Under Illinois law a mortgage is incident to the debt,
and where the debt is barred by the statute of limitation,
the mortgage is no longer a lien on the premises. 117 On the
other hand, where a mortgagor dies, and the mortgagee
fails to present his claim in the probate court, the fact that
his claim becomes barred against the estate does not prevent
a suit to foreclose against the heir or devisee. 118 Under the
Corporation Act, 119 where a corporation has been dissolved,
suits must be brought against the corporation within two
years or they are barred. In Markus v. Chicago Title & Trust
Company 20 the court held that although a corporation had
been dissolved for more than two years the mortgagee could
proceed in his action in rem to foreclose. Dissolution thus
was likened to the death of an individual and did not dissolve the indebtedness for which the mortgage was security.
The relation of a judgment, rendered at law pursuant
to a counterclaim filed in the mortgage proceedings, to the
mortgage indebtedness sought to be foreclosed was discussed
in the case of State Bank of St. Charles v. Burr.2 ' In this
case the defendant had filed his counterclaim and had re116 Hack v. Snow, 338 IRl. 28, 169 N.E. 819 (1930); Williams v. Williston, 315
Ill. 178, 146 N.E. 143 (1925).
117 Reeves, Illinois Law of Mortgages and Foreclosures, § 10; Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510, 58 N.E. 221 (1900).
118 Reeves, op. cit., § 10, Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 46 N.E. 197 (1897).
119 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32, § 157.94: "The dissolution of a corporation . . .
shall not take away or impair any remedy given against such corporation, its
directors, or shareholders, for any liability incurred prior to such dissolution if
suit thereon is brought and service of process had within two years after date of
such dissolution."
120 373 Ill. 557, 27 N.E. (2d) 463 (1940).
121 372 Ill. 114, 22 N.E. (2d) 941 (1939). Note, 18 CHicAco-KENT LAW Ravriw 291.
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ceived a judgment on the law side prior to the decree of
foreclosure. He thereafter contended that this judgment
could not be set off against the mortgage indebtedness prior
to sale, for the reason that such a set-off would constitute the
rendition of a personal judgment in violation of Section 17 of
the Mortgage Act.1 22 The court, however, pointed out that
the chancellor had the power to adjust the equities of the
parties in the foreclosure proceding and to find the net
amount of the lien. Thus, the application of the judgment in
reduction of the mortgage indebtedness was held not to constitute the rendition of a personal judgment but merely to
fix the net amount of the lien. The mortgage indebtedness
can be set off against the judgment on the counter-claim
and vice versa, and up to the point where the judgment on
the counter-claim is equal to, or more than, the mortgage
indebtedness, a foreclosure decree can be entered.
In Bank of America v. Jorjorian25 a dismissal with
prejudice entered in a suit against a grantee who had assumed and agreed to pay the indebtedness was held to be as
conclusive of the rights of the parties as if suit had been
prosecuted to final adjudication adverse to the plaintiff. Thus,
the defendant-grantors in the case, who stood as sureties to
the grantee, were released from liability upon the entry of the
said order in the former proceedings.
1 2 4 the AppelIn two cases entitled Tudor v. Firebaugh,
late Court divided over several problems involved in foreclosure and reorganization. The premises had been foreclosed and bid in at the sale by the trustee, who did not
pay any cash. He thereupon proceeded to manage the premises until a successor trustee was appointed. The latter, after
receiving instructions as to the management of the premises, presented a plan of reorganization which set up trustees, provided for distribution of rents and profits, provided
122 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, § 17: "In all decrees hereafter to be made in
suits of equity directing foreclosure of mortgages, a decree may be rendered for
any balance of money that may be found due to the complainant, over and above
the proceeds of the sale or sales, and execution may issue for the collection of
such [payment of money]. . . . And such decree may be rendered conditionally,
at the time of decreeing the foreclosure, or it may be rendered after the sale and
the ascertainment of the balance due. .. ."
123 303 Ill. App. 184, 24 N.E. (2d) 896 (1940).
124 303 Ill. App. 452, 25 N.E. (2d) 576 (1940); 303 Ill. App. 467, 25 N.E. (2d) 568
(1940).

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR

1939-1940

for sale and termination after fifteen years, and which ordered the interest of the bondholders to be personalty. Both
depositing and nondepositing bondholders were treated alike
under the decree. In reversing the lower court, the Appellate Court held, among other things, and this by way of
somewhat desultory comment, that it was error to allow
fees to counsel and the master in chancery based on evidence which did not set forth any statement as to time
consumed by claimants in performing the work for which
they sought to be paid; that the court had no power to change
the bondholders' interest in real estate under their trust deed
into personalty; that after sale the court did not retain jurisdiction for purpose of passing upon a plan of reorganization,
nor could it liquidate the premises without knowledge of the
bondholders and authority in the trust deed; and that the
trustee could not borrow on the property and charge nondepositing bondholders.
TITLES

Whether or not a widow's dower interest may be divested
without her written consent seems to depend upon whether
her husband died prior to the effective date of the new Probate Act. The case of Gradler v. Johnson'1 held that, under
the prior statutes,12 6 the dower interest could not be taken
without a consent, but the act of 1939 changes this rule.'2 7
The only question of interest which remains is whether a
dower interest which was consummate before the effective
date of the new provision is subject thereto. And it is submitted that this question is answered in the negative by
Section 346,128 which states that the express repeal of all inconsistent acts by Section 345129 does not "affect . . . a
claim, right, power, or remedy accrued under any law in
force prior to the effective date. . . .110
372 IMl. 137, 22 N.E. (2d) 947 (1939). Note, 34 Ill.
L. Rev. 878.
126 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 41, § 39 and Ch. 106, § 32.
127 "On application by the person entitled to dower or by any person having
an estate of inheritance in the real estate, the court shall order that the real
estate be sold at public sale free of the dower interest and that a sum of
money equal to the gross value of the dower interest as assessed by the court
be paid as dower from the proceeds of the sale to the person entitled to dower."
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 185 (c).
128 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 501.
129 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 500.
180 See note 128 supra.
125
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The rule that the Statute of Limitations will not run
against the title of the sovereign was avoided in Trustees of
Schools v. Lilly, 131 where the court indulged in the presumption of a patent by the State of Illinois from the evidence of
exclusive possession under claim of ownership for eighty years, the
fencing, cultivation and use of the land, the prevailing reputation as to
title in the neighborhood, together with the assessment and payment of
taxes for seventy-eight years....

This presumption of a patent was not rebutted by the trustees
of schools, plaintiffs in ejectment, and the decision was for
the defendant. The court declined to confuse the issue and
refrained from "bolstering" the result with a holding that
the Statute of Limitations does run against one who holds
"for a very limited portion of the public." The decision is
sound, but a note of warning might well be sounded. The
evidentiary doctrine of "ancient grants" when applied to
disputes between private individuals has been crystallized
into a rule of substantive law, and the courts have refused
to permit a rebuttal of the presumption. If this process should
occur in cases involving a sovereign, there will be a violaof the
tion of the policy underlying the rule denying the 13effect
2
state.
the
of
title
the
bar
to
Statute of Limitations
In Saunders v. Saunders,1 33 the Supreme Court reversed
the Appellate Court and decided that there may be a reservation in a deed in favor of one not an owner, provided that the
person in whose favor the reservation is made is the grantor's spouse who joins in the deed with the grantor for the
purpose of waiving inchoate dower. The land in question was
owned by Mrs. Saunders, and her husband joined with her
in a deed purporting to reserve unto the grantors the use
of the farm for and during their natural lives. Mrs.
Saunders predeceased her husband, and the Supreme Court
in deciding that the surviving husband had a life estate followed its dictum in certain earlier cases,3 4 although it
based its decision primarily on what it considered the obvious
intention of the parties to the deed, namely that the grantee
131 373 hi. 431, 26 N.E. (2d) 489 (1940).
132 For a discussion of this problem see note, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 88.
133 373 IM. 302, 26 N.E. (2d) 126 (1940).
134 Legout v. Price, 318 Ill. 425, 149 N.E. 427 (1925); Du Bois v. Judy, 291
340, 126 N.E. 104 (1920).

l.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1939-1940

as well as the grantors understood and intended that the husband should have a life estate in the event he should survive
his wife. The court in reaching its decision did not overturn
the doctrine that there cannot be a reservation in favor of a
stranger.
In Texas Company v. Wal '13 5 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held sufficient an exception in a deed purporting to
convey a twenty-acre tract of land "except about (25/100)
acres on the Westerly side [of the tract] to be deeded to the
Centralia Water Works Company," since the quoted words
were descriptive of the excepted parcel and afforded a means
of determining the excepted part by their reference to an
existing contract with the Water Works Company. The court
referred to and recognized the general rule that an exception
in a deed of conveyance must contain an identifying description of the land excepted, but held that such requirement is
satisfied if the language of the exception provides information which, when supplemented by competent extrinsic evidence, satisfactorily identifies the excepted parcel. The
court also held that if the extrinsic evidence is competent,
it is not material that it consists of official records or parol
evidence of agreements or written contracts.
OIL AND GAS

In PredestinarianBaptist Church v. Parker3 6 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a church, to whom land
had been conveyed "as long as the same was used . . . as a
place of meeting," could execute an oil and gas lease without terminating the qualified fee of the church. After the
execution of the lease, the church used the premises regularly once a month as a place of meeting. It was held that the
limitations upon the use of the land did not, under the circumstances, prevent the leasing of the land for oil and gas
purposes, since this use was not a speculative venture but
was a necessary move to obtain from the property its real
value. Five wells had been drilled on adjacent land within
150 feet of the well on the church property, and two had been
drilled within 250 feet of the church premises. All seven of
135 107 F. (2d) 45 (C.C.A. 7th, 1939). Note, 28 Ill. B. J. 241.
136 373 IM. 607, 27 N.E. (2d) 522 (1940).
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the wells were in operation at the time of the leasing by the
church. If a well had not been drilled on the church premises,
all the underlying oil and gas might have been drained to
adjoining wells and lost to the holders of the title to the
church premises.
Mode v. Whitley'37 is a case wherein the U.S. District
Court of Illinois held that a contract, partly oral and partly
written, for an oil lease of 169 acres of ground for "ten years
or as long as oil should be produced," was a contract to occupy leased premises for an indefinite period and was therefore an agreement to confer a freehold estate upon the lessee.
The only writing in evidence was a receipt signed by George
F. Whitely which recited payment to him of $10 on account of
an oil and gas lease on land "containing approximately 169
acres in Sections 15 and 17, Township 13 North, Range 7 East
of the Third Principal Meridian, Coles County, Illinois." The
court held that the contract was within the Illinois Statute of
Frauds' and that the memorandum of contract was insufficient because the land was not sufficiently described. It
was also held that the deposit in escrow of an oil lease which
was to be delivered to the lessee upon payment of the sum
stated in the memorandum as balance due did not overcome
the defects in the memorandum. In reaching this decision,
the court cited and followed decisions by the Illinois Supreme
Court relative to the deposit of deeds in escrow. The established doctrine requires a valid contract between the parties,
and if the memorandum is insufficient as such, it cannot be
aided by the delivery in escrow of a deed containing none of
13 9
the essential agreements of the parties.
In Triger v. Carter Oil Company,1 4 ° the Supreme Court
held that a freehold corporeal interest in the land itself
passed to the grantee in a mineral deed purporting only to
convey the oil and gas under a certain tract described in the
deed. In reaching this decision the court was following the
well established rule in Illinois that title to oil and gas in
place can not pass to a grantee because they are fugacious
Supp. 129 (1939).
138 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 59, § 2.
Johnson v. Wallden, 342 Ill. 201, 173 N.E. 790 (1930); Main v. Pratt, 276 Ill.
218, 114 N.E. 576 (1916).
140 372 Ill. 182, 23 N.E. (2d) 55 (1939). Notes, 18 CHicAGo-KExT LAw REVIzw 208;
137 30 F.
139

35 Ill. L. Rev. 176.
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and incapable of ownership, and they belong to the owner
of the land only so long as they remain underneath the land,
and for this reason the title to the oil and gas alone can not
pass to the grantee in the deed. 4 ' It was held that the mineral deed conveyed not only the right to take oil and gas but
granted also the right to the grantee to enter upon the land
for the purpose of prospecting and operating wells. The deed,
being for a period of indefinite duration and being a conveyance of an interest in the land itself, created a freehold
14 2
estate.
In Gray v. Schoonmaker,14 3 the United States District
Court of Illinois decreed specific performance in favor of
lessees where a lessor, after executing an oil lease, orally
agreed that if the lessees would drill on land adjoining the
leased land and that if oil were not discovered thereon, the
lessor would relieve the lessees of obligation to drill on the
leased land and would execute a lease covering other land.
The lessees accepted the oral proposition and drilled on the
adjoining land and, no oil having been discovered thereon,
sought specific performance of the oral agreement for a
-lease on the other land. The lessor contested the lessees'
right to specific performance and sought to defeat it on the
theory that the performance relied upon by lessees was not
on the same lands as that concerning which specific performance was sought. The court held that the partial performance need only have reference to the contract relied
upon, and not to the land concerning which specific performance is sought.
MISCELLANEOUS
144
In Famous Permanent Wave Shop, Inc. v. Smith,
the lessee sought to have the lessor enjoined from declaring a
forfeiture of the leasehold estate in accordance with the express provisions of the instrument and from taking any ac-

141 Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53, 122 Am. St. Rep. 144
(1908); Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Il. 361, 88 N.E. 818, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1108
(1909).
142 Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53, 122 Am. St. Rep.
144 (1908); Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N.E. 645, 15
A.L.R. 507 (1921).
143 30 F. Supp. 1019 (1940).
144 302 Il. App. 178, 23 N.E. (2d) 767 (1939). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw
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tion to recover possession of the demised premises, notwithstanding the fact that the lease expressly provided that the
lessor should have the right to declare a forfeiture and take
possession upon lessee's failure to perform certain covenants
which the lessee had breached. The Appellate Court held
that subsequent events had not nullified the right of the lessor
to declare a forfeiture for failure to pay rent promptly in
advance as provided in the lease, notwithstanding the lessee
had frequently been several days late in payment, without
any protest being made by lessor. The lease was explicit in
its provisions that the acceptance of rent either in a single
instance or repeatedly should not be construed as a waiver
by lessor of his right to declare a forfeiture, and the decision
in favor of the lessor is sound, although the case was in
equity and there is a recognized tendency by courts of equity
to extend the doctrine of relief against forfeiture.
In Haskell v. Art Institute,1 4 5 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the owner of chattels may dispose absolutely
of his interest in such property during his or her lifetime
even though it is the donor's intention by making such gift to
deprive his or her spouse of dower rights in the event that
such spouse should survive the donor and renounce the provisions of the donor's will. It was held that a gift of paintings
was complete and effective as a gift inter vivos upon the execution of a donation agreement providing that the donor
should retain possession for a year, and acknowledgment of
that agreement in a letter by the donee accepting the gift
under the terms of the agreement. The transaction was not
testamentary in character, although the donor's will confirmed the transfer and provided that, if the transfer failed,
the paintings were bequeathed to the donee. The court, in
discussing the agreement and the letter of acceptance, held
that actual delivery was unnecessary to effect a gift and
said: "In each of these, the language is clear and specific
and shows that . . . [decedent] intended and did make a gift
of the paintings ... which was accepted." The court also held
that the validity of the transfer was not affected by the
statute against fraudulent conveyances, 4 6 since no right of
145
146

304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E. (2d) 736 (1940).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 59, HU4 and 6.
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the donor's wife had been invaded, and that the transfer was
not merely colorable since there was a sufficient delivery of
the paintings to the defendant Art Institute.
CONTRACTS
INSURANCE

Of slight importance, but as a case of first impression in
Illinois,'4 7 the Appellate Court determined that a wife's "inchoate right of dower!' is a mere intangible and contingent
expectancy, and, its value being unascertainable, it cannot
provide an insurable interest in a dwelling house the legal
title of which is in her husband's bankruptcy trustee. In a
few other jurisdictions, where dower has been offered as the
basis of an insurable interest, the courts have arrived at the
same conclusion even though the value of an inchoate right
of dower has been recognized in condemnation proceedings,
distribution of property in divorce proceedings, and enjoinder
of waste.
Lack of insurable interest in the decedent's life defeated
the plaintiff in the case of Foreman v. Great United Mutual
Benefit Association.148 The company issued a policy to the
plaintiff upon her cousin's life. It appears that the plaintiff
asked the cousin if she might take out such a policy and was
answered in the affirmative, but no affirmative authority or
agency was shown and it appeared doubtful if the decedent
ever knew that the policy had been issued.
The meaning of the word "permission" under the "omnibus clause" of automobile liability coverage received extended exploration in Byrne v. Continental Casualty Company. 4" The plaintiff attempted to widen the scope of permissive use under the terms of the policy, and to make the
chauffeur (on a spree of his own) an additional assured under the circumstances. The court was able to distinguish the
instant case from Karton v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company,5 ' and Jefson v. London Guarantee & Accident Com147 Patterson v. Durand Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 303 Ill. App. 128, 24 N.E.
(2d) 740 (1940).
148 302 IMi.App. 276, 23 N.E. (2d) 813 (1939).
149 301 Ill. App. 447, 23 N.E. (2d) 175 (1939).
150 280 Ill. App. 201 (1935).
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pany,151 as well as from Jackson v. Bankers Indemnity Insurance Company,15 these latter cases allowing recovery by
the plaintiff but inapplicable to the Byrne case.
With no reference to the Insurance Code provisions, the
rule that false representations, material to the risk, relied
upon by the insurer, will avoid the policy even though made
through mistake or in good faith was reannounced in Conti13
nental Assurance Company v. McCarty,1
and substantially
so in Krajewski v. Prudential Insurance Company."' However, Thompson v. State Mutual Life Assurance Company'55
was differentiated on the facts, and the plaintiff recovered.
The lively question of liability of the insurer of a host
driver to the guest for "willful and wanton or intentional
acts" of the host when "willful and wanton or intentional
acts" is expressly excluded from coverage under the policy
was decided in favor of the insurer in Hill v. Standard Mutual
Casualty Company.'5 6 The victim was left to seek redress
from the insured himself. The court did not overlook the social theory that the insurance money may be the only fund
available for the injured party, but refused to adopt a theory of ambiguity of the quoted words urged by the plaintiff,
holding the policy exclusion to be clear and unambiguous and
not against public policy. The case was determined on the
pleadings and argument thereon.
Although Section 201 of the Insurance Code 5 ' provides
that
no order, judgment or decree, restraining or interfering with the prosecution of the business of any company . . . shall be made or granted
otherwise than on the petition of the Director represented by the Attorney
General,

the state's attorney of Sangamon County filed a complaint in
quo warranto against several defendants alleging that they
were transacting an insurance business without authority.
The defendants resisted the suit on the ground, inter alia, that
Section 201 barred anyone but the Director of Insurance from
151 293
153 302
154 305
155 305
156 110

Ill. App. 97, 11 N.E. (2d) 993 (1937).
152 277 Ii. App. 140 (1934).
Ill. App. 10, 23 N.E. (2d) 385 (1939).
Ill. App. 64, 26 N.E. (2d) 892 (1940).
Ill. App. 255, 27 N.E. (2d) 330 (1940).
F. (2d) 1001 (1940).
157 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 73, § 813.
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maintaining the action. The court held the instant suit to be
an interference with the Director's exclusive field of activity
and dismissed the complaint. 5 '
That blood stains on a safe occasioned by the employee's
being struck over the head with a gun and then forced to open
the safe did not constitute "marks made by tools ... or other
chemicals" was held in Bridge v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Insurance Company'5 9 and coverage under the policy was
denied. The argument of the plaintiff was novel but too far
fetched to come within the protective blanket of ambiguities
which could be construed against the company.
QUASI-CONTRACTS

In Usalatz v. Estate of Pleshe,160 the Appellate Court,
without the aid of Illinois precedents, decided in accordance
with the weight of authority, and with what would seem to be
the better view, that a woman could not recover on a contract implied in law for the reasonable value of her services
as a housekeeper from the estate of a man with whom she
had lived for a number of years as his wife when in fact there
had been no marriage. This conclusion was based upon the
assumption that there was no fraud or deception practiced
upon the plaintiff, and was reached after an extended study
of decisions from other jurisdictions. The court pointed out
that the presumed relationship of husband and wife negatived
any possible expectation of compensation and that the courts
would not imply a promise to pay for services arising out of
an illicit cohabitation.
A related problem was presented to the Appellate Court
in the case of In re Lyons' Estate.'' The sister-in-law of a
decedent filed a claim in the Probate Court against his estate for services rendered as housekeeper and nurse. Upon
a trial de novo in the Circuit Court a new trial was granted
after a verdict of a jury allowing the plaintiff's claim for
$2,500. There was evidence to show that both parties .understood that the services were not to be rendered gratuitously.
158 People v. Hargreaves, 303 Ill. App. 387, 25 N.E. (2d) 416 (1940), noted, post,
Discussion of Recent Decisions.
159 302 Ill. App. 1, 23 N.E. (2d) 367 (1939). Note, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1324.
160 302 Ill. App. 392, 23 N.E. (2d) 939 (1939).
161 303 Ill. App. 642, 25 N.E. (2d) 555 (1940).
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The will of the decedent bequeathed one-fifth of the income
from the estate to the plaintiff for life. As the assets of the
estate amounted to less than $6,000, this annuity would scarcely exceed $50 per year. The court overruled the order granting a new trial and ordered judgment on the verdict.
The decision was undoubtedly correct in holding that
there was sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption,
arising from the relationship of the parties, that the services
were gratuitous, but ignores a further problem presented by
these facts. Although it may have been the intention of both
parties that compensation should be forthcoming, it is not
clear whether the court regarded the bequest of income to
have been intended as compensation or as having no relation
to the claim for services. The court apparently takes the
view that there was an implied contract between these
parties but the opinion leaves in doubt the question of whether
the court meant an actual contract existing upon the facts or
whether it meant merely an obligation to make restitution
arose quasi-contractually. In either event it would seem necessary to decide whether, in making provision for the plaintiff in his will, the decedent intended to discharge his obligation or to make the plaintiff an additional gift. The queston is important, since, if the decedent intended to discharge
his obligation but made inadequate provision, the judgment
should be in lieu of the bequest or the jury should have been
instructed to take the bequest into consideration in determining the amount the plaintiff was entitled to as the fair value
of her services. The difficult problem in cases of this kind is
the ascertainment of the actual and exact intention of the
162
parties.
MISCELLANEOUS

The tendency is to think of the seal as an anachronism
which is gradually disappearing in favor of the more up-todate doctrine of consideration. That it has not gasped its
63
last breath is made plain by the case of Whyte v. Rogers.1
True, there is a statute in Illinois permitting the defense of
See note, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 87.
303 Ill. App. 115, 24 N.E. (2d) 745 (1940), where the court held to be irrevocable an exclusive agency for a definite time given by a sealed writing. Note,
28 Ill. B. J. 239.
162
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want or failure of consideration in actions on sealed instruments, 164 but this statute has been construed to apply only to
negotiable instruments. 16 5 As to other contracts, then, the
seal still carries its ancient attributes. However, we seldom
see nowadays a written contract, even though it be under
seal, that does not recite or disclose some form of consideration. And, with the forms of action eliminated so that the contract may be sought to be enforced on the theory of assumpsit or covenant, courts of appeal seldom find it necessary to
notice the seal or its effect. Yet it may be suggested that we
are not yet prepared to discard it altogether. There is a
growing feeling that, when a person intentionally executes
a writing with the object of creating a legal obligation, the
technical requirement of consideration, which Holmes said
was as much a form as a seal, should not prevent legal effect
from being given to the intent. 166 This feeling must even be
shared by the courts, who sometimes require a consummate
skill at gymnastics in order to find the presence of a consideration which does not exist. 167 Until we solve the problem by adoption of the Uniform Written Obligations Act it
may be suggested that lawyers may be more certain and
courts more honest by use and recognition of the seal.
In Cherry v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,6 " the
Supreme Court of Illinois disposed of a controversy as to
rights of subrogation and conflicting claims between certain
holders of bonds which were issued to finance a building
project and a surety company which had assumed liability
on the bond of the general contractor which had agreed to
erect the hotel building in question and had defaulted, leaving a number of subcontractors unpaid. The obligee in the
bond, a hotel company, was adjudged a bankrupt while still
owing the general contractor a portion of the agreed compensation. The subcontractors meanwhile had filed mechan164

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 98, § 10.

165 Chicago Sash Mfg. Co. v. Haven, 195 I1.

474, 63 N.E. 158 (1902).
Henry W. Ballantine, "Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and Illogical," 11 Mich. L. Rev. 423 (1913); Ernest G. Lorenzen, "Causa and Consideration
in the Law of Contracts," 28 Yale L. J. 621 (1919); Wright, "Ought the Doctrine of
Consideration to Be Abolished from the Common Law," 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1225
(1936).
167 As in In re Estate of Wheeler, 284 Ill. App. 132, 1 N.E. (2d) 425 (1936).
168 372 IM. 534, 25 N.E. (2d) 11 (1940).
166
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ics' liens on the building. In order that the hotel might continue in operation, a receiver was appointed in the bankruptcy proceedings, who brought suit in the Circuit Court of
Vermilion County against the surety company and recovered
a judgment. The hotel property was put up for sale by the
bankruptcy court and certain of the bondholders desiring to
bid were permitted to do so only after making a deposit sufficient in amount to cover the claims of the subcontractors,
and their deposits were applied to the satisfaction of such
claims. Having supplied the money to pay the subcontractors, the paying bondholders claimed subrogation to the right
of the latter against the surety company on the bond of the
general contractor and that they had acquired rights superior to those of the surety company notwithstanding the fact
that the bond of the general contractor made express provision for subrogation of the surety company in the event of
default by the general contractor. The court held that subrogation is not simply a matter of contract but is one of
equitable right and that the bondholder's right of subrogation was superior to that of the surety company.
In the field of Sales, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Appellate Court which denied a conditional
vendor a right to priority over the vendee's attaching creditor in the proceeds of the resale of the chattel sold under a
conditional sale contract, although the contract expressly
provided that the proceeds of the resale would be held in
trust for the conditional vendor. 169
The Motor Vehicle Law and the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Anti-Theft Act are not recording statutes, the Appellate Court
held.' ° Hence, a buyer of a second-hand automobile who
does not receive the seller's certificate of title is not charged
with notice of a defect in the seller's title.
TORTS

The rule laid down in McDavitt v. Boyer,'' as to privileged communications, wherein the court said:
169 Kilgore v. State Bank of Colusa, 372 Ill. 578, 25 N.E. (2d) 39 (1940). See notes
on the case in the Appellate Court in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 42 and 28 Ill.
B. J. 154.
170 L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N.E. (2d) 129 (1940),
noted, post, Discussion of Recent Decisions.

171 169 Ill.
475, 483, 48 N.E. 317 (1897).
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Whatever is said or written in a legal proceeding, pertinent and material
to the matter in controversy, is privileged; and no action can be maintained upon it,

appears to have been extended to remarks made by counsel
in negotiations for settlement before legal proceedings are
instituted. In Dean v. Kirkland,' 2 it was alleged that, during
such negotiations, remarks were made by one of the attorneys which were defamatory of the client of the opposing
attorney. Although the court disposed of the case on other
grounds, it said as to this matter:
Discussions between attorneys representing opposing parties should not
be discouraged. Such discussions have a tendency to limit the issues or
to settle the litigation, thereby saving the time of the court. . ..
It
would be contrary to public policy to penalize attorneys by making
them respond in damages under the circumstances disclosed by the
complaint.

Further application and extension of the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,173 imposing absolute liability, irrespective of negligence, for damage caused by use of explosives,
appears in Baker v. Healy Company. 1 4 In this case, the
Healy Company, operating under their contract with Chicago Sanitary District, which contract was authorized by an
ordinance of the city of Chicago, in constructing an intercepting sewer, was using dynamite for blasting. The Appellate Court, in reversing the lower court, held the City, the
Sanitary District and the Contractor all liable, citing and fol7 5
lowing Fitz Simmons & Connell Company v. Braun & Fitts,'
77
7 and Macer v. O'Brien.'
City of Chicago v. Murdock,'
In Hyba v. C. A. Horneman, Inc.,' 8 the Illinois Supreme
Court decided that an action for wrongful death under the Injuries Act is entirely different from and independent of an
action under the Dram Shop Act for the same wrongful
death, and that the outcome of either action is not res judica172 301 Ill. App. 495, 23 N.E. (2d) 180 (1939). See also Parker v. Kirkland, 298
Ill. App. 340, 18 N.E. (2d) 709 (1939).
173 L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
174 302 III. App. 634, 24 N.E. (2d) 228 (1939).
175 94 Ill. App. 533 (1901), aff., 199 111. 390, 65 N.E. 249 (1902).
176 212 Ill. 9, 72 N.E. 46, 103 Am. St. Rep. 221 (1904).
177 356 Il. 486, 190 N.E. 904 (1934).
178 302 Ill. App. 142, 23 N.E. (2d) 564 (1939). Notes, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW
312; 28 Ill. B. J. 215.
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ta of, and has no bearing upon, the other. Mary Hyba died as
the result of an accident alleged to have been caused by the
intoxication of one Lowery, with whom she had been riding as
his guest. Her father, as administrator of her estate, brought
an action against Lowery under the Injuries Act, which action was terminated by a settlement in the nature of a covenant not to sue. Subsequently, the action now under discussion was brought by the parents and a brother and sister of
the decedent against C. A. Horneman, Inc., under the Dram
Shop Act. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the settlement of the first suit was a bar to any
subsequent action to recover for the same death, but the
decision of the court below was reversed by the Appellate
Court, thereby settling a question which appears theretofore
to have been in considerable doubt.
In Consolidated Biscuit Company v. Illinois Iowa Power
Company179 it was decided that, where a city contracts with
a private corporation to operate waterworks for the purpose
of furnishing water to a city and its citizens, a property owner
cannot hold the city or water company liable for loss by fire
occasioned by the failure of the water company to furnish an
adequate supply of water for fire protection. The court held
that the plaintiff could not recover, either ex cohtractu or
ex delicto. Recovery in tort was denied on the basis that the
failure to furnish an adequate supply of water was, at most,
the denial of a benefit, and not the commission of a wrong.
The court distinguished the case of Clark v. Public Service
Company,' relied on by the plaintiff, on the ground that,
in the Clark case the act of the defendant in arbitrarily cutting off the supply of electric current going to the premises of
the plaintiff was an affirmative tortious act. As to the action
ex contractu the court denied recovery on the ground that
there was no privity of contract between the water company
and the plaintiff which would support the action, stating that
this question had been before the highest judicial tribunals
of a large number of states, and in all of them, except Kentucky, North Carolina, and Florida, this rule had been adhered to. As Illinois authorities the court cited Rostad v.
303 Ill. App. 80, 24 N.E. (2d) 582 (1940). Note, 28 Ill. B. J. 296.
180 278 IU. App. 426 (1935).
179
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Chicago Suburban Water & Light Company,'"' Peck v. Sterling Water Company,' and City of Galena v. Galena Water
8 3
Company.
84
The case of Nice v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
may constitute the final demise, in Illinois at least, of the
mistaken term "negligence per se." The plaintiff's intestate,
while driving a truck across the defendant's tracks in the
Village of Chestnut, an unincorporated village of about 300
people, was struck and killed by a fast passenger train of the
defendant, which was traveling at a speed of about 90 miles
per hour. The court said:
It is hard for this court to see in this day and age, and under the circumstances proven in this case, how it can determine that it is negligence
per se to operate a train at the rate of 90 miles per hour through the
village....

Although there was much evidence of contributory negligence in this case, the decision may appear inconsistent with
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company v.
Bodemer,8 5 in which a speed of 40 miles per hour in the
city of Chicago, on the railroad tracks adjacent to Thirtyfourth Street was held to be such wanton and wilful misconduct as to permit recovery, even by a trespasser upon the
railroad property. An attempt to raise this point was made
in the Appellate Court, in the instant case, but the court held
that the allegations of the complaint did not charge wilful
and wanton misconduct; the case was tried and the jury instructed on the theory of general negligence, and the Appellate Court deemed it too late for the appellee to raise the
question in that court. It would appear, therefore, that, in
Illinois at least, instead of endeavoring to prove existence of
the doubtful or nonexistent element of "negligence per se,"
plaintiffs' attorneys in such cases will increase the probability of a favorable outcome by inserting in the complaint, in
each case where facts and circumstances are similar to the
instant case, a "wanton and wilful" count.
Stine v. Union Electric Company
181 163
183 132
185 139
186 305

6

deals with the viola-

IU. App. 63 (1911).
182 118 III. App. 533 (1905).
184 303 Il. App. 292, 25 N.E. (2d) 104 (1940).
Ill.
App. 332 (1907).
Ill.
596, 29 N.E. 692 (1892).
Ill.
App. 37, 26 N.E. (2d) 433 (1940).
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tion of a statute prohibiting parking of a vehicle within 20
feet of a cross-walk or intersections 7 as evidence of negligence and as the proximate cause of the injury to one struck
by another vehicle while crossing the street. The defendant's
truck was parked in violation of the statute, with its front at
the cross-walk intersection, thereby materially interfering
with and obstructing the view of drivers of vehicles approaching the cross-walk on the east side of the street, and of pedestrians approaching the east side of the street on the crosswalk. The plaintiff, a five-year-old child, started across the
street at the cross-walk, ran in front of the truck and into an
automobile which was then passing the truck, proceeding toward the cross-walk and street intersection. The court found
no case in Illinois similar on the facts, but cited, reviewed,
and followed a line of cases from other jurisdictions,"' holding that the statute violated was intended not merely to keep
open the crossings at intersecting streets for pedestrians
but to add to the safety of pedestrians in the use of such
cross-walks. It further held that violation of a statute prescribing a duty for the protection and safety of persons and
property is evidence of negligence if such violation caused or
contributed to causing the injury; that, to constitute proximate cause, the negligent act or omission must be one of the
essential causes producing the injury but need not be the sole
cause nor the last or nearest cause; that it is sufficient if it
concurs with some other cause, acting at the same time,
which in combination with it causes the injury.
A case which, in some respects, appears to extend the
doctrine of respondeat superior is Metzler v. Layton.8 9 Layton was office manager of a loan corporation with offices in
Chicago, which corporation was also made a party defendant
to the action. He also did extra work, from time to time for
one Adelman. Metzler, the plaintiff, was employed as a messenger boy for Adelman, and was well known to Layton. One
morning when Layton was alone in the office shortly after it
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95 , §§ 98, 109, 111 and 187.
188 Milbury v. Turner, 274 Mass. 358, 174 N.E. 471 (1931); Kuba v. Nagel, 124
S.W. (2d) 597 (Mo. App., 1939); Knecht v. Lombardo, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 447, 91 P.
(2d) 917 (1939); Winsky v. De Mandel, 204 Cal. 107, 266 P. 534 (1928); Blessing v.
Welding, 226 Iowa 1178, 286 N.W. 436 (1939).
189 373 Ill. 88, 25 N.E. (2d) 60 (1939).
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was opened, three strangers entered. They covered Layton
with guns and one of them ordered him to face the wall,
which he did. They robbed Layton, then ordered him to tell
where the money was and to open the safe. The safe was
opened and the robbers began a search of the office. At this
point Metzler came into the office on an errand. Layton warned Metzler not to come in, but he entered, and the robbers
locked him and Layton in a clothes closet. A minute or so
elapsed and the robbers left. Layton was aware of this by the
sound of the automatic door closer; so he and Metzler freed
themselves from the closet. Layton procured a pistol from his
desk and ran out of the door of the office and down the corridor of the building with the pistol in his hand. Metzler followed shortly. At the intersection of two corridors, Layton
looked toward the elevators. There was nobody in sight. He
turned and looked in the other direction down the hall, and
saw someone running toward him yelling, as he claimed,
"Stick 'em up," although this was denied on trial. Layton
fired at the approaching figure. The man, who was Metzler,
fell, and Layton shot him again. His injuries were serious.
No property of the corporation was taken by the robbers,
but only money belonging to Layton. In holding the corporation, Layton's employer, liable, the only Illinois authority
cited by the court is Baum v. Industrial° Commission,9 '
where an employer was held liable for the death of an employee killed by strikers who rushed into the shop while the
employee was trying to defend his fellow-employees and the
employer's property. The employee was not in charge of the
premises and was not a person in authority, as was Layton
in the instant case. The court then states that the duty of an
office manager, by the very character of his position, is more
comprehensive than is the duty of a mere employee or special servant, and cites Central Motor Company v. Gallo'9 as
authority for holding that his employer is responsible for his
acts done in safeguarding its property, even though the manager acts unwisely. The court held that the fact of Layton's
private, personal motive for the chase did not exclude the interest of the corporation, since the pursuit was the continu190 288 IlM.516, 123 N.E. 625 (1919).
191 94 S.W. (2d) 821 (Tex. Civ. App., 1936).
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ation of one transaction, and Layton, under the circumstances, could not know whether any of the corporation's
property had been taken, nor did he pause to investigate
when free. The court further held untenable the contention of
the corporation that it was not liable because the act was done
beyond its premises.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Little change has occurred in the substantive law of
crimes; but three decisions are worthy of notice. In one,
People v. Robinson, "2 the defendant, who had been charged
with conspiracy to administer drugs to race-horses in violation of Chapter 8, Section 37hl of the Illinois Revised
Statutes, contended such statute was unconstitutional because it was ambiguous and failed to define a criminal offense. It was held that, although the act was not skilfully
drawn, it stood the tests of constitutionality. In another,
People v. Purcell,193 a more striking problem arose. There
two defendants were indicted for conspiracy to violate the
gambling laws by agreeing to play for money at a game of
cards. The prosecution was evidently predicated on the conspiracy statute,9 though the act of gambling, if engaged
in, would have fallen under a different provision. 95 The
defendants moved to quash the indictment on the ground
that since the principal crime, gambling with cards, would
require the conduct of two persons at least, there could be
no such thing as a conspiracy so to do, since neither, alone,
could have perpetrated the completed offense by himself.
The court upheld this contention, despite the lack of local
precedent, adopting the so-called Wharton's Rule, 19 6 though
being careful to recognize the distinction that if the conspiracy had been between others than the actual gamblers, or
between the gamblers and still other persons, or had been a
conspiracy to commit an offense which was capable of commission by either conspirator when acting alone, then the
result would have been different.
372 II. 503, 24 N.E.
304 Ill. App. 215, 26
194 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939,
196 Wharton, Criminal
192

193

(2d) 376 (1939).
N.E. (2d) 153 (1940).
Ch. 38, § 139.
195 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 324.
Law (12th ed. by Ruppenthal), II, 1862, § 1604.
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19 7
The defendant in the third case, People v. Martin,
on several occasions obtained goods from the prosecuting
witness by falsely stating that the goods were being secured
for the defendant's employer. Each such purchase was paid
for at the time of the succeeding transaction. When the defendant made the final purchase he promised to return in a
day or so to pay for the last two purchases, but he neither
returned nor made payment. He was convicted of obtaining
goods by means of a confidence game, 9 8 but on writ of error his conviction was reversed on the ground that his conduct had amounted to obtaining property by false pretense;' 9 9
the essential element of the confidence and trust reposed by
the victim was deemed lacking, and proof of another and
distinct crime was, of course, insufficient to sustain the conviction. The generality of the wording of the two statutes
involved prevents the drawing of any clear distinction between the two offenses, but the court seems to intimate that
a mere misrepresentation, or even a series thereof, will not
suffice to secure the essential "confidence and trust" of the
victim.

Significant decisions affecting the field of criminal procedure are more in evidence. The ambiguity as to jurisdiction
over criminal offenses in Cook County as between the criminal court 200 and the county court thereof2 0 1 was discussed
in People v. Dickelman, 2 wherein it was decided that the
two courts possessed concurrent jurisdiction in cases where
the punishment is not imprisonment in the penitentiary or
death. The Supreme Court, in People v. Crabb, °3 again
called attention to, and again condemned, the illegal practice
of public officials in detaining arrested persons incommunicado for long periods of time without returning them before
a proper magistrate for preliminary examination as is re372 Ill. 484, 24 N.E. (2d) 380 (1939). Note, 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 724.
198 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38 § 256.
199 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 253.
200 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 701 provides: "The Criminal Court of Cook
County shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all criminal offenses . . . "
201 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, § 177 provides: "The County Courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction . . . in all criminal offenses and misdemeanors where the
punishment is not imprisonment in the penitentiary or death."
202 304 Ill. App. 482, 26 N.E. (2d) 704 (1940). See also Discussion of Recent Decisions, post.
203 372 Ill. 374, 24 N.E. (2d) 46 (1939).
197
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quired by law.2 04 Such condemnation was made effective by
requiring the submission of such fact to the trial jury as having a bearing on the validity of a confession secured during
such period of illegal detention.
Lengthy detention after preliminary examination and before trial, however, did not operate favorably to the defendant in People v. Stillwagon,0 5 who relied thereon to secure
his discharge for want of prosecution. 0 6 The defendant had
engaged in an armed robbery in Lake County on August 18,
1936, and thereafter drove the stolen truck to Cook County
where he was apprehended on August 20th and charged with
larceny. 2 7 He was held there, in default of bail, until November 18th, when the charge was stricken with leave to reinstate. Defendant was removed to Lake County, indicted for
armed robbery and again held, in default of bail, until his
trial commenced on February 8, 1937, making a total imprisonment of five months and twenty days, though only two
months and twenty days thereof had occurred in Lake
County. It was held that his motion to discharge for want of
prosecution was properly denied since the statute applied
only to detention beyond the statutory period of four months
by the county which had jurisdiction of the offense, viz., Lake
County. While the decision appears obviously correct, it carries the implication that over-zealous officials, in prosecuting
a larceny charge where the stolen property was carried through several counties, might detain the offender, in
successive fashion, far beyond the time contemplated for
prosecution.
The scope of appellate review in criminal cases was involved in People v. Finkelstein,0° in which, on defendant's
motion, the indictment had been quashed, and such action
had been affirmed by the Appellate Court on appeal by the
State 2 09 as permitted by statute.21 0 When the State sought
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch.38, § 664.
205 373 Ill.
211, 25 N.E. (2d) 795 (1940).
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 748.
207 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 707 gives jurisdiction over larceny to any county
into or through which the stolen property may have passed. Venue on the robbery
charge was necessarily confined to Lake County under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38,
§ 703.
208 372 Ill.
186, 23 N.E. (2d) 34 (1939).
209 299 IM. App. 363, 20 N.E. (2d) 290 (1939).
210 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch.38, § 747.
204
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further review before the Supreme Court, the defendant objected on the ground that the statute did not authorize such
action, claiming that the State was not seeking the review of
"an order or judgment quashing or setting aside an indictment or information" but rather was seeking to review the
action of the Appellate Court in affirming the trial court's
decision, which, so the defendant contended, was not within
the language of the statute. His contention was rejected as
"sticking in the bark," though the court was careful to distinguish the situation from that in People v. McArdle,211
where, after reversal of the trial court's action quashing the
indictment, it was pointed out that there was no final order
212
on which to predicate further review. In People v. Dobbs
the defendant, after his conviction had been affirmed, filed
a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis and
succeeded in securing appellate review of the trial court's
ruling thereon despite the objection of the State that the conviction had already once been reviewed and affirmed. The
Supreme Court held such motion was not a direct attack on
the earlier affirmance but a collateral inquiry authorized by
law, disregarding decisions in other jurisdictions to the contrary.
The burden of proof to establish an alibi in extradition proceedings was considered in People v. Bell,213 and
was placed on the alleged fugitive to prove he was not
present in the demanding state at the time of the alleged
offense. The prima facie case made the extradition request
and the accompanying affidavits were not overcome by
merely raising a doubt as to the accuracy thereof, but required "clear and satisfactory proof" that the accused was
not present in the demanding state.2 14
211 370 Ill. 513, 19 N.E. (2d) 328 (1939). See also 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 51.
212 372 Ill. 160, 23 N.E. (2d) 343 (1939). See also 18 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REV w 304.

372 Ill. 572, 25 N.E. (2d) 45 (1940).
Since the attack by habeas corpus on extradition proceedings is essentially
a civil suit to protect the petitioner's civil rights, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 60, § 2,
it was deemed proper for the trial court to take into consideration the failure of
the alleged fugitive to testify in his own behalf, the civil rule, illustrated by The
Central Stock and Grain Exchange v, The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago,
196 Ill. 396, 63 N.E. 740 (1902), rather than the criminal rule, found in Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 734, and applied in People v. Corry, 349 Ill. 122, 181 N.E. 603,
(1932), being applicable.
213
214
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REMEDIES
CIVIL PRACTICE

While the legislature has found no emergency requiring
amendment of the various practice provisions, the courts
have been busy interpreting, clarifying, and explaining the
operation of the Civil Practice Act. Six years of reformed
procedure have not yet developed all the significant problems, nor have scores of decisions removed all the complications from the path of the practitioner. The following cases
are, therefore, worthy of note as illustrating the solutions
found during the past year for some of these problems.
In Baker v. S. A. Healy Company, 15 sixty-two separate
plaintiffs, living within a radius of two blocks, but each owning separate parcels of land, joined together in a tort action
to recover damages for separate personal injuries and property damage arising from the conduct of a sewer contractor
in dynamiting a sewerage tunnel under an adjacent street.
The municipal corporations, on whose behalf the work was
undertaken, were joined as defendants. Each defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint, or, in the' alternative, to
sever the separate causes, relying on an alleged misjoinder
of plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal it was held that the joinder fell within the provisions of
Section 23 of the Civil Practice Act,2 1 since it involved the
same transaction or series of transactions and that therefore
217
the trial court had erred in dismissing the complaint.
The use of the counterclaim to settle all disputes between
the litigants is well illustrated in The State Bank of St.
Charles v. Burr,218 in which a mortgagee filed suit to foreclose and the mortgagor filed a counterclaim to recover
damages for mismanagement and waste caused by the mortgagee while in possession. The equitable issue was tried by
215 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N.E. (2d) 228
216 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 147.
217 In distinguishing the instant case

(1939).

from Gombi v. Taylor Washing Machine
Co., 290 Ill. App. 53, 7 N.E. (2d) 929 (1937), discussed in 15 CHIcAGO-KENT REvixw
303, the court indicated it regarded such case as not in accord with the spirit of
the reformed procedure, though not in point as involving joinder of parties in an
equity case.
218 372 Ill. 114, 22 N.E. (2d) 941

(1939), noted in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RrEviw

291. For earlier litigation involving the same parties see 295 Ill. App. 15, 14 N.E.
(2d) 511 (1938) and 283 Ill. App. 337 (1936).
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the chancellor, who determined the amount due on the mortgage. The issue on the counterclaim was tried separately
before a jury resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor
of the mortgagor, which amount the chancellor credited
against the debt due, satisfying the judgment thereby, and
ordered sale for the balance due the mortgagee. From this
action the mortgagor appealed, claiming the trial court
should not have so set one claim off against the other, but
219
should have left each to stand as a separate judgment.
It was held, however, that the manner of entering the decree
was proper, inasmuch as the claims were mutual and self220
cancelling.
The local counterclaim provision, however, differs from
the one controlling procedure in the United States courts, as
the litigants learned in Grodsky v. Sipe.221 That was a suit
instituted against a trustee in bankruptcy to impress a lien,
in favor of a remainderman, upon funds in his hands belonging to a bankrupt testamentary trustee, in order to compensate for losses sustained by reason of the latter's failure to
dispose of certain assets promptly to pay charges thereon, resulting in substantial loss to the remainderman when the
assets were finally sold. Earlier litigation had been brought
in the state court by the legatee holding the charge to compel
its payment. The present plaintiff was made a defendant
thereto and could have, but did not, present a counterclaim
against her codefendant, the testamentary trustee. The
trustee in bankruptcy moved to dismiss the instant suit on
the ground of res judicata, contending that the state court
proceeding had settled all issues as between the parties which
were, or might have been, presented, relying on the federal
court rule as to counterclaims. 2 2 The trial court properly
considered the effect of the state, rather than the federal,
219 Presumably the mortgagor hoped the premises would sell for more than sufficient to pay the total debt due, leaving him the holder of an unsatisfied tort judgment against the mortgagee.
220 People v. Frick, 367 Ill. 446, 11 N.E. (2d) 955 (1937) distinguished. (Counterclaim proper, when sheriff sued for taxes collected, to secure judgment for monies
advanced by him in caring for prisoners, but separate judgment required, because
one was a personal demand, while claim for taxes constituted a trust fund; so,
obligations not regarded as being mutual.)
221 30 F. Supp. 656 (1940).
222 Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure for the District Courts promulgated by the
Supreme Court of the United States; 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723c.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

rule,2 and decided that the Illinois provision was permissive and not mandatory, so that the plaintiff's failure to submit the issue by way of counterclaim in the earlier proceeding had not involved the loss thereof.22 4
The content of the various pleadings, including the manner of allegation, seems fairly well settled, and reference to
earlier practice will usually resolve most doubts. Thus the
former requirement that a bill of review should set forth at
length and verbatim the pleadings in the original case22 5
was still a requisite to proceedings brought under the present procedure, according to the court in Davis v. Oliver.22
The necessity for setting forth affirmative defenses in the
answer was considered in Parker v. Dameika,227 and it was
there pointed out that such defenses are not available to
defendant unless so pleaded, nor can one affirmative defense
be shown upon pleading the existence of another and distinct
affirmative defense. The desire for informative pleadings
stressed by Section 43 (4) of the Civil Practice Act 228 thus
stands reinforced.
An innovation in pleading was introduced by Rule 13 (3)
of the Supreme Court, 229 relieving the plaintiff from the necessity of making extended reference to the conditions precedent to the defendant's liability and to the manner in which
such conditions were satisfied. This rule was involved in
Bigelow v. Oglesby, 230 in which the plaintiff filed suit on an
underwriting agreement. The latter contained a provision
that it should be a nullity unless a specified amount was subscribed within an allotted time. The complaint, without
giving specification thereto, alleged that the plaintiff "in all
things and in all respects duly performed all its obligations
and undertakings and all conditions in the said contract con223 Section 38, Civil Practice Act; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 162.
224 For earlier Illinois cases involving defendant's right to fie counterclaim,
rather than effect of failure to present one, see 15 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 338; 16 id.
279; 17 id. 60; and 18 id. 32, 43, and 57.
225 Cox v. Lynn, 138 Ill.
195, 29 N.E. 857 (1891).
App. 71, 25 N.E. (2d) 905 (1940). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
226 304 Ill.
291.
227 372 Ill. 235, 23 N.E. (2d) 52 (1939). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 294.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 167.
228 Ill.
229 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.13 (3).
230 302 Ill. App. 27, 23 N.E. (2d) 378 (1939).
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tained to be by it performed." The defendant contended the
complaint was deficient for failure to allege that the prescribed amount was subscribed within the time set. 231 For
this, and other reasons, the complaint was dismissed. On appeal it was held that the method of pleading used by the
plaintiff was expressly sanctioned by Rule 13 (3) of the Supreme Court, 232 and that the plaintiff was not obliged to say
more than he did.
Joinder of several claims in one proceeding, permitted
under Section 44 of the Civil Practice Act,23 3 frequently involves the question as to which tribunal shall try the compound issues thus created. If the several claims are legal
and equitable, or all equitable, but some of such nature as
to require trial before a jury, the court is authorized to sever
such claims by Section 51 of the act2 34 and to hold separate
and appropriate hearings in order to preserve the rights of
the parties to the proper type of hearing. Such right, however, may, according to Flynn v. Troesch,2 38 be expressly
waived, in which case the court may, without a jury, hear all
of the issues at one time.
Liberal use of the right to amend, in order that no man's
claim might be lost through accidental error, is recognized
by Section 46 (3) of the Civil Practice Act,2 3 6 but this right
is qualified by Oetting v. Graham,37 which, following earlier
practice, requires that such amendment shall not be permitted substantially to alter the case unless the defendant is
given an opportunity to meet the new case by appropriate
amended pleadings or unless he is afforded an opportunity
to present additional testimony on the new issues thus
created. The right to amend, likewise, may not be used
as the basis for reviving claims barred by limitation, though
the plaintiff in Nolan v. Sloan2 38 urged that such should be
the case. There the plaintiff confessed judgment upon two
231 The motion to dismiss made no mention of this ground, but it was, nevertheless, argued and passed upon by the trial court. Proper practice would require
that the motion to dismiss enumerate the grounds relied on, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939,
Ch. 110, § 169.
232 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.13 (3).
233 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168.
234 IlM.Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 175.
235 373 Ill. 275, 26 N.E. (2d) 91 (1940).
236 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 170 (3).
237 373 Ill.
247, 25 N.E. (2d) 886 (1940).
238 305 Ill.
App. 71, 26 N.E. (2d) 990 (1940).
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promissory notes against the makers thereof and also against
several persons who had executed a guaranty upon the reverse side thereof. These guarantors subsequently successfully moved to vacate such judgment upon the ground that
they had given no warrant of attorney to confess the same.
Thereafter they moved to strike the complaint as failing to
state a cause of action against them, the claim being based
upon the note whereas their liability rested upon the annexed contract of guaranty. They were again successful.
Thereafter the plaintiff filed an amended complaint setting
forth the contract of guaranty, which was again attacked by
motion to strike on the ground that the statute of limitations
had run thereon. The trial court so found and dismissed the
action as to the guarantors. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that since her original action had been instituted in
apt time, the subsequent amendment was within the statute
of limitations." 9 It was held that the amended complaint did
not merely amend an existing action begun in apt time, but
in fact stated an entirely new cause, and hence, was properly
barred.
The provisions regarding confession of judgment were
involved in two cases. In the first, Morris v. Levin,2 40 the
judgment was secured on a bond executed by the defendant.
The latter, with full knowledge thereof, waited almost three
months before moving for a permanent stay of execution on
the ground that the obligation had, prior to judgment, been
discharged in bankruptcy. His motion was granted over the
plaintiff's objection that the defendant had been guilty of
laches in failing to present his petition within the statutory
period of thirty days.24 1 It was held that such statute did not
apply, since, by the discharge in bankruptcy, the warrant
to confess judgment had become functus officio and no valid
judgment could be predicated thereon, hence, that prompt
action to stay execution was unnecessary. In the other
case2 42 the defendant, a resident of Whiteside County, exe239 Civil Practice Act, sec. 46; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 170; Metropolitan
Trust Co. v. Bowman Dairy Company, 369 Ill. 222, 15 N.E. (2d) 838 (1938), noted
in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 60.
240 302 Ill. App. 173, 23 N.E. (2d) 779 (1939).
241 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, §§ 82-83.
242 May v. Larson Company, 304 Ill. App. 137, 26 N.E. (2d) 139 (1940).
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cuted certain judgment notes in that county. Thereafter the
plaintiff took judgment by confession in the Superior Court
of Cook County, which judgment the defendant, in apt time,
moved to vacate, and also sought leave to plead to the merits
and to file a counterclaim. Subsequently the defendant again
moved to vacate the judgment on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction. Both motions were denied. On appeal the court recognized that the effect of Section 50 (5) of
the Civil Practice Act24 3 was to deny the Cook County court
power to render the judgment in the first instance, but held
that the question of venue had been waived by the defendant's initial motion which had operated as a general appearance.
The debate over the "fusion" between law and equity
continues.2 4 4 Further ammunition was provided by the practical, though rather unorthodox, handling of the problem in
Nikola v. Campus Towers Apartment Building Corporation,245 wherein the plaintiff had sued for personal injuries
in the Circuit Court of Cook County on a complaint obviously
stating a cause of action at law, hence properly triable before
the law side thereof. The sheriff certified that service had
been secured on the defendant by leaving a copy of the
summons with an agent. Upon the defendant's default, judgment was granted in the plaintiff's favor. Execution was issued thereon more than thirty days after such judgment had
been secured, and the defendant, on receipt thereof, petitioned the court to vacate such judgment and allow it to plead,
contending the sheriff's return was false. The plaintiff moved
to dismiss such petition, thereby admitting the truth of such
allegation, on the ground that since the application was not
made within thirty days after judgment 246 the defendant's
recourse should have been by motion in the nature of a writ
of error coram nobis authorized by Section 72 of the Civil
Practice Act, 24 7 resort to which would have been useless,
inasmuch as at law the validity of the sheriff's return is
243 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939,
244 See R. L. Severns,
REVIEw 333 (1940).
245 303 Ill. App. 516, 25
246 Section 50 (7) Civil
247 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939,

Ch. 110, § 174 (5).
"Equity and 'Fusion' in Illinois," 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
N.E. (2d) 582 (1940).
Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 174 (7).
Ch. 110, § 196.
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conclusive after judgment,2 4 8 or else by a separate proceeding in equity to restrain the enforcement of the judgment.
The trial court, nevertheless, vacated the judgment and gave
the defendant leave to plead. On appeal from such order,2 4
it was held that the petition, admittedly ineffective under
Section 72,250 could nevertheless operate as the equivalent
of a complaint in equity, the court seeing no sound reason
why the petition should be dismissed with direction to the
defendant to file a complaint in equity and come back a
few days later, when the relief would be granted, especially
since the trial court was one possessing jurisdiction over
causes at law and in equity.
The Supreme Court has placed its stamp of approval on
Section 64 (3) of the Civil Practice Act2"' by holding,25 2
as had been the case in several earlier Appellate Court decisions,253 that the decree or judgment is presumed to be
supported by evidence, and any one who attacks such a finding has the burden of preserving the evidence if he desires
appellate review thereof. Of similar significance is Doellefield v. Travelers Insurance Company,5 4 in which the plaintiff appealed from an adverse judgment. The defendant contended that the errors of the trial court, if any, were not
open to review, since the plaintiff had made no written motion for a new trial, as appears necessary by Section 68 of
the Civil Practice Act.2 55 It was held that, since the section
merely perpetuates the former practice,25 the language
would be given the same effect as heretofore and be regarded as directory rather than mandatory. If a written
motion is filed, however, the party is limited to the grounds
therein assigned.25 7
Owens v. Ranstead, 22 Ill. 161 (1859).
Defendant sought to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no final order was
involved. The court, recognizing that if defendant had proceeded by complaint in
equity and had secured a decree thereon such order would be a final order, came
to the same conclusion on the instant petition.
250 Defendant expressly stated it had not sought and did not seek to invoke such
section, 303 Ill. App. 516, 525, 25 N.E. (2d) 582, 587.
251 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 188 (3).
252 Sauter v. Pickrum, 373 Ill. 541, 26 N.E. (2d) 844 (1940).
253 Note, 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 367, listing the cases.
254 303 Ill. App. 123, 24 N.E. (2d) 904 (1940). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw
293.
256 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 110, § 77.
255 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 192.
257 Ulbricht v. Western Coach Lines, 289 Ill. App. 164, 6 N.E. (2d) 931 (1937).
248
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As was said before, the problem of securing appellate
review still engages attention. For over one hundred years
appellate courts in Illinois have reviewed errors of fact in
civil cases, setting aside verdicts if necessary, though preserving the litigant's right to trial by jury by remanding
the cause for further proceedings in a proper case. Legislation so -providing, modified from time to time, and now cumulated in Section 92 of the Civil Practice Act,2 58 was recently
challenged for the first time as being unconstitutional in
Corcoran v. City of Chicago.5 9 The attack was unsuccessful, although the court recognized the necessity for remanding in order not to invade the right of trial by jury.
The requirements for perfecting an appeal were clarified in
2 60 by making the filing of
Francke v. Eadie
the notice of
appeal in the trial court the principal jurisdictional factor,
and holding that failure of the appellate record to disclose
such fact could be cured by an additional transcript. A slight
delay in filing the praecipe for record was also considered in
Harris v. Sovereign Camp of Wooodmen of the World,
Inc., 61 as being insufficient reason for dismissing the appeal. Of similar import was McDaniels v. Terminal Railroad
Association,262 in which notice of appeal was filed eighteen
days after rendition of judgment and a copy thereof was
served three days later. The appellee sought to have the appeal dismissed for failure to serve notice within twenty days,
claiming that since the appellant had acted under Section 82
of the Civil Practice Act,2 63 in such fashion as to make his
Il. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 16.
259 373 Ill. 567, 27 N.E. (2d) 451 (1940), cert. den. 61 S. Ct. 45 (1940), noted, post,
Notes and Comments. Plaintiff therein, whose judgment was originally reversed
and remanded, believing that a new trial would be of no service, requested the
Appellate Court to strike the remanding portion of its order. His request was
granted. Such action was necessary in order to secure review of the primary
question, inasmuch as otherwise the decision of the Appellate Court would not have
been a "final" one. Hartley v. Red Ball Transit Co., 344 Ill. 534, 176 N.E. 751 (1931).
260 373 Ill. 500, 26 N.E. (2d) 853 (1940), reversing 301 Ill. App. 254, 22 N.E. (2d)
720 (1939). Notes, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 89 and 416.
261 302 Ill. App. 310, 23 N.E. (2d) 793 (1939). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
290. Appellant filed its praecipe for record eleven days after filing its notice of
appeal. Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that such praecipe,
under Rule 36 of the Supreme Court, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.36, should
have been filed within ten days and the consequent delay was fatal. The motion
was denied.
262 302 Ill. App. 332, 23 N.E. (2d) 785 (1939).
263 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 206.
258
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notice of appeal operate as a supersedeas, he was obliged
to complete the process and serve such notice within the
twenty days allotted thereby. The court, in denying such
motion, pointed out that the only provision relating to service
264
of notice was to be found in Rule 34 of the Supreme Court,
which required such service to occur within ten days after
filing in the trial court and because this had been complied
with the appeal could not be dismissed. Had the appellee
contended that the notice had failed to operate as a supersedeas a different problem might have arisen.
Some other scattered decisions affecting procedure are
interesting. In McDougal v. Perry2 5 a sole plaintiff instituted proceedings in forcible entry and detainer. 266 During the pendency of the action, the plaintiff transferred her
interest in the premises in question, and thereafter, before
substitution of the assignees as plaintiffs, she died. When
the assignees petitioned for leave to be substituted as plaintiffs, the defendant contended that the cause of action had
been abated and could only be revived under the Abatement
Act 2617 in favor of the heirs, which the assignees did not
purport to be. The petitioners relied, however, on Section 54
of the Civil Practice Act26 and were granted leave to proceed. On appeal, it was held that the earlier provision of
the Abatement Act was to be read in conjunction with the
Civil Practice Act section, so that the action did not abate
if either section warranted the substitution of a different
plaintiff.
Pursuant to rule of the Municipal Court of Chicago the
defendant in Universal Credit Company v. Antonsen,26 9 a
replevin action, was ordered to reveal the whereabouts of the
res, and, upon refusal so to do, he was punished for contempt of court. On appeal he contended that such rule was
264

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.34.

265

301 Ill. App. 272, 22 N.E. (2d) 727 (1939).

Ill.
apply to
267 Ill.
268 Ill.
266

Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 57, § 11 provides that the Civil Practice Act shall
such proceedings.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 1, § 10.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 178 reads: "Where by reason of .. . assignment

. . . after the commencement of a cause or proceeding . . . causing a change or
transmission of interest . . . the action shall not abate . . . "
269 301 Ill. App. 334, 22 N.E. (2d) 790 (1939). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw
190.
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an unlawful usurpation of legislative power by the Municipal
Court in an effort to add to the remedies provided by the
Replevin Act,27 0 but the Appellate Court held such provision
was a regulation of practice and procedure, hence within the
rule-making power of the court.2 '
Shadows of a possible impending change in the law relating to remedies may have been forecast in Susemiehl v.
Red River Lumber Company,2 72 from which it appeared
that two suits had been instituted by the administrator
against the same defendant, the first to recover for the
wrongful death of his intestate, and the other to recover the
damages to his estate by reason of the expenses incurred
between the date of the accident and the date of the death
which proximately resulted therefrom. The defendant moved
to dismiss the second suit by reason of the pendency of the
first case, contending that such first action provided plaintiff
with his sole and exclusive remedy. The plaintiff appealed
from an order sustaining the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The Appellate Court felt obliged to sustain such order by
reason of long established precedent,2 73 but gave the impression that had the question been a novel one the view found
in other jurisdictions, that on such facts two distinct causes
of action arise, might well have been adopted.
EVIDENCE

A controversy arose in the Municipal Court of Chicago
over the use to be made of depositions taken by the plaintiff and not filed in court. Thereafter, the defendant obtained
a rule upon the plaintiff to file them, but the plaintiff never
used them. The depositions contained substantially the testimony which the two defendants personally testified to upon
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 119, § 18.
Subsequent to the period of this survey the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, 374 Ill. 194, 29 N.E. (2d) 96 (1940), on the ground that such rule was
unconstitutional, since it gave the plaintiff an additional remedy, hence altered the
substantive rights of the parties and was not a mere rule of procedure. The court
distinguished the situation from one in which defendant interfered with the property
after official seizure thereof, which conduct, even without a rule, would be contempt of court.
272 305 Ill. App. 473, 27 N.E.
(2d) 285 (1940), noted, post, Discussion of Recent
Decisions.
273 Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131 (1882).
270
271
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the trial, and in spite of this fact, the defendant offered
them, and they were received in evidence over the plaintiff's
objection. The Appellate Court held in Home Life Insurance
2 74 that,
Company v. Franklin
under the circumstances, to
read the depositions on the trial was error, for such use did
not fall within the express authorization of Municipal Court
Rule 149. Further, since the general rule is that depositions
are taken de bene esse, subject to the contingency of the witness being unable to attend the trial, the spirit of the law was
violated and, in effect, the testimony of the two defendants
was given twice to the jury.
In Weber v. Buck, 275 the rule (new in Illinois last year) 276
that where a crime is charged in a civil suit, the proof to
establish it need be only a preponderance of the evidence,
was reiterated.
In People v. Conzo,2 77 the defendant, a woman, was interrogated by the grand jury, who were seeking information
against two lawyers. She refused to answer questions and,
when she again refused to answer before the court on the
ground that her answers would tend to incriminate her, she
was held in contempt. This case poses the old circular question of whether, since the witness need not explain how the
answers would incriminate him, for such explanation might
deprive him of his protection, it will not therefore be impossible for the commitment order to be so complete that
when an appellate court examines it, it may determine whether the witness's refusal was justified. The situation is not new, but no solution is offered to the judge in
charge of the grand jury, whose commitment order is overridden.
In Trustees of Schools v. Lilly, an action in ejectment
for alleged school lands,2 7 a presumption of fact based upon
a sheriff's deed, long.continued adverse possession, and payment of taxes, plus a presumption of fact that all school
trustees, tax collectors, etc., know that section 16 is school
274 303 Ill. App. 146, 24 N.E. (2d) 874 (1940).
275 302 Ill. App. 218, 23 N.E. (2d) 759 (1939).
276 Sundquist v. Hardware Mutual Ins. Co. 371 Ill. 360, 21 N.E.
Note, 17 CRICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 371.
277 301 Ill. App. 524, 23 N.E. (2d) 210 (1910).
278 373 Ill. 431, 26 N.E. (2d) 489 (1940).

(2d) 297 (1939).
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land unless sold, was more than the plaintiff trustees could
overcome by relying upon the grant of section 16 of the
State of Illinois as school lands, plus the absence of any evidence that a patent was ever issued to the premises in question.
Motion pictures as evidence 27 9 received the approval of
the Appellate Court again, and certain legal objections to
technical treatment of the continuity of the film were happily
disposed of in favor of the picture. A further objection that
the motion picture operator had been an eyewitness of the
scenes he had "shot" and could therefore testify as to what
he saw (the pictures thereby becoming second-best evidence)
was held invalid since the operator could not describe in detail just how the plaintiff was behaving as was done by the
use of the camera. After all the trial lawyers have attended
the "cinema" several times, it is to be expected that they
will realize that even judges see moving pictures, and thus
finally, the motion picture will grow up in the law of evidence.
EQUITY

Most of the important equity cases in the reviewing
courts of Illinois during the year involved principally procedural questions. In the case of Schuler v. Wolf 8 ° the question arose of the effect on a judgment for damages, awarded
upon the dissolution of a temporary injunction, of a final
decree granting the plaintiff's prayer for a permanent injunction. The plaintiff sued for temporary and permanent
injunctions restraining the defendants from further performing certain contracts. A temporary injunction was granted
and the Appellate Court reversed an order overruling a motion to dissolve. One defendant filed a suggestion of damages
for the wrongful issuance of the injunction. The trial court
therafter awarded damages against the plaintiff in the
amount of $1,065.96 and entered a decree sustaining a motion to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff appealed from
the order of dismissal directly to the Supreme Court, as a
constitutional question was involved, and paid the award of
damages pending the appeal. The Supreme Court decided
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that the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction.2 81
Thereupon the plaintiff petitioned the trial court to vacate
the order assessing damages and sought to have the Supreme
Court review the order dismissing the petition. The Supreme
Court ruled that since no appeal was taken from the order
assessing damages it had no jurisdiction to determine the
issues presented.
The Illinois Injunction Act appears to authorize t h e
award of damages for the issuance of a temporary injunction before the final disposition of the case.28 2 Since the issues
which arise out of an application for a temporary injunction
are not necessarily the same as those which the court must
decide in granting a permanent injunction, the award of a
permanent injunction does not always determine the propriety of the temporary order. Yet in the instant case it appears that the reasons given by the Supreme Court for the
granting of permanent relief would be equally decisive of
the question of whether temporary relief was proper. Apparently, the court takes the view that a decision upon the issues
involved in dissolving the temporary injunction is necessarily independent of the final outcome of the case. Such a result
is not required by the Injunction Act and would seem to be
undesirable in a case like the present one. The court might
have considered the question of damages as incident to its
2 83
determination of the merits of the cause.
Another case of passing interest involving temporary
injunctions was the decision of the Appellate Court, following
the usual phrasing, that a temporary injunction mandatory
in character is ordinarily improper.2 84
A novel situation involving the remedy of interpleader
was presented in Hatzenbuhler v. Modern Woodmen of America.2" 5 In this case an injunction was improperly obtained
in an interpleader action restraining the prosecution of a suit
281 Schuler v. Board of Education, 370 Ill. 107, 18 N.E. (2d) 174 (1938) discussed
in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 5.

282 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, § 12; People v. Eisenberg, 288 Ill. 304, 123 N.E.
532 (19f"9).
283 See comment 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 184.
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previously started by one of the claimants. Upon the dissolution of the injunction, the plaintiff in interpleader obtained the dismissal of the interpleader action over the objection of the other claimant, who appealed. Thereafter the
interpleader plaintiff filed an answer and counterclaim for
interpleader in the original suit brought against it and obtained an injunction which had the effect of preventing the
appealing claimant from perfecting his appeal. It was held
that the granting of the injunction was error. The purpose of
interpleader is to prevent, not promote, multiplicity of suits.
The result seems proper in view of the fact that the plaintiff
could have obtained an injunction affording it ample protection in the first interpleader action had it followed the
proper procedure. After having been brought into the interpleader action at the instance of the plaintiff, it was inequitable to require the claimant to appear and prosecute its claim
in a second suit. The equities did not favor granting the
plaintiff injunctive relief.
One of the most interesting decisions of the Supreme
Court during the period covered by this survey was that
8 6 The problem
handed down in the case of Lee v. Hansberry.
involved the application of the doctrine of res judicata to
representative suits. An action was brought to enforce a
"restrictive agreement" whereby the parties covenanted
that none of the property covered by the agreement should
be sold, leased to, or permitted to be occupied by colored
persons. The agreement contained a provision that it should
be of no force and effect unless signed by 95 per cent of the
property owners within the area affected. The defendant's
answer set up the invalidity of the agreement because it
was not signed by the requisite number of owners. The plaintiff contended that this question was res judicata by virtue
of the decision in Burke v. Kleiman."7 In the latter case
the plaintiff, wife of one of the defendants in Lee v. Hansberry, brought suit on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated to enforce the same agreement. The case was
determined upon an agreed set of facts including a stipulation that the requisite number of owners had signed the agreement. The court held in Lee v. Hansberry, two justices dis286
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senting, that the validity of the agreement was conclusively
determined in Burke v. Kleiman.
It is possible that the result may be justified in view of
the relationship which existed between certain of the parties to both suits, but the basis upon which the decision is
placed seems unfortunate. The trial court in Lee v.
Hansberry found as a fact that not more than 54 per cent
of the property owners had signed the agreement. In the
first case the issue was confined to whether or not the agreement continued to be enforcible in the light of changed conditions in the area involved.
Apparently these are the first cases in Illinois applying
the device of the representative suit to restrictive covenants
of this kind. Many objections can be voiced to the view taken
by the majority in Lee v. Hansberry. The decision purports
to hold that all signers of the agreement are estopped to question its validity, although most were not actually parties to
the determination of this issue. The representative suit can
become an oppressive device unless care is taken to see that
the interests of all members of the class are adequately and
fairly represented. In the instant case the binding force of
the agreement was expressly made dependent upon its being
signed by the requisite number of owners. It seems clear
that the interests of those who wished to resist the validity
of the agreement on this ground were not fairly represented
in a suit involving a different issue where the parties stipulated that the requisite number had signed. The majority
view permits the actual parties to the litigation by their mere
stipulation to bind all other signers regardless of their desires
or interests. The court might have decided the case on ordinary equitable principles. Since considerably less property than the parties to the agreement deemed essential was
subject to its restrictive force, the court could have ruled
that a decree enforcing the agreement would be ineffective
to carry out its purpose.
As this survey goes to press, the Supreme Court of the
United States has handed down a decision reversing Lee v.
Hansberry on the ground that the action of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in applying the doctrine of res judicata to
these facts denies to other signers, not actual parties to the
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first suit, the adequate protection of their interests to which
due process of law entitles them. The opinion, written by
Mr. Justice Stone, takes the position that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants in Burke v. Kleiman were in posi28
tion adequately to represent the other signers.
Two other cases involving traditional equity points of
view should be mentioned. The Supreme Court refused to
sanction the reformation of a deed which contained a misdescription of the land intended to be conveyed and which
was given in consideration of the "love and affection" of a
father for a daughter. 2 9 The reason given was that equity
will not reform a voluntary conveyance. In response to the
argument that there was a meritorious consideration, the
court said, citing prior Illinois cases, that to constitute a
meritorious consideration the existing moral obligations must
at some antecedent time have been a legal one. The decision
in Kent v. City of Chicago 290 may be noted as indicating
that equity courts today have less hesitancy on policy grounds
in restraining criminal prosecutions and in determining the
issues of criminality incident to such relief than they used
to exhibit.
CONFLICT OF LAWS

Two cases discussed at some length in the Survey for
1938-1939 came before the Supreme Court for final decision
late in 1939. The decision in the case of Berlingieri v. Berlingieri'9 ' has already received extended treatment.2 9 2 Because the defendant was an "international itinerant" with
merely a technical domicile in Italy, the court refused to
find that the domicile of the plaintiff-wife had shifted from
Illinois upon her marriage.
Passing notice 29 3 was given to a decision of the Appellate Court 29 4 which refused recognition and enforcement to
288 Hansberry v. Lee, decided November 12, 1940. Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr.
Justice Roberts, and Mr. Justice Reed concurred in the result. The decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois is commented on in 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 563 and 35 Ill.
L. Rev. 213. The latter comment discusses the constitutional question.
289 Marvin v. Kelsey, 373 Ill.
589, 27 N.E. (2d) 469 (1940).
290 301 Ill.
App. 312, 22 N.E. (2d) 799 (1939).
291 372 Ill.
60, 22 N.E. (2d) 675 (1939).
292 18 CHICAcO-KENT LAW REVIEW 15; and 18 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 178.
293 18 CHIcAco-KENT LAW REVIEW 65.
App. 173, 18 N.E. (2d) 578 (1939).
294 Baker v. Brown, 298 Ill.
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an Oklahoma judgment for an amount in excess of the
amount claimed in the pleadings. This decision was reversed
by the Supreme Court 295 upon the ground that the excessive
amount of the judgment did not destroy the jurisdiction of
the Oklahoma court and no other question was open to a
court in Illinois. The Appellate Court had placed its decision
upon certain Oklahoma decisions dealing with the effect of
judgments not responsive to the issues. The Supreme Court
found these Oklahoma cases were not in point. This view,
which confines the court in the second state in the ordinary
case to the issue of jurisdiction, is to be preferred.
The reverberations of the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the now famous case of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins 2 6 continue to be heard everywhere. The doctrine of this case was tangled with questions
of public policy in the recent decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company. 97 Suits for wrongful deaths of the plaintiff's
husband and son were brought in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The injuries causing the deaths occurred in Michigan, and the defendant relied upon the Illinois statute, which, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, forbids the bringing of wrongful
death actions in Illinois for deaths occurring outside of the
state.2 98 It was admitted that the Illinois legislature has
no power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts but
it was argued that the statute defined the public policy of
Illinois and that the federal court was bound to recognize
such policy under the decision in the Erie case.
The court correctly ruled that the public policy of a state
could not constitutionally impose binding limitations upon
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This ruling does not
necessarily dispose of the matter, however. Public policy in
the conflict of laws is a devise whereby the forum may refuse to apply the foreign law indicated by the usual conflict
of laws rules. The proper use of the device requires the
forum to consider only the public policy of its own state or
295
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country and to employ it only when the enforcement of a
cause of action arising elsewhere or the application of foreign law would have undesirable effects in such state or
country. 2 9 In cases arising in state courts, difficulties occur
only with respect to the task of interpreting public policy.
Federal and state courts possess independent jurisdiction over the same territory, and this fact creates an additional problem in employing the public policy device. As has
been indicated above, the applicable *public policy is ordinarily that of the state or country whose judicial power the
forum exercises. If this point of view is carried into effect a
federal court should consider only the national policy. Yet
such a result is unsatisfactory in many cases, particularly
where jurisdiction attaches on the ground of diversity of citizenship. With respect to many matters concerning which the
different states have different policies, no national policy
exists. Probably, it would not be desirable for the federal
courts to initiate a practice of formulating such policies in
hope of achieving national unity with respect to these matters.3 00
The Erie case appears to postulate three generalizations
bearing upon the problem in hand: First, the jurisdiction 0 1
of federal courts is independent of the states in which such
courts sit; second, the procedure in such courts is entirely a
federal matter; third, the "rules of decision" are those provided by state law, where no federal question is involved.
Public policy may be simply a question of whether or not the
application of a rule or principle of the law of another state
will cause harmful effects in the country of the forum, or
it may be a question of whether a cause of action should be
permitted in consideration of its possible effects. In either
event, it is not a question of the existence of jurisdiction as
the court in the instant case seemed to believe.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Erie decision appears to have intended to place the federal courts,
in diversity of citizenship cases, upon the same footing as the
299 For a valuable discussion of public policy see A. Nussbaum,
and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws," 49 Yale L. J. 1027
300 The arguments concerning the place of public policy in the
are discussed by Nussbaum in the article cited in note 299 at 1052,
30, In the "power" sense, of course.

"Public Policy
(1940).
interstate field
et seq.
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courts of the states in which they sit with respect to the decision of cases involving no federal questions. Such courts
necessarily, under this view, become interpreters of the policy of the states in which they sit and whose laws they apply.
Public policy considerations may arise in connection with the
application of almost any kind of legal rules or principles.
In the great bulk of such matters, if the federal courts occupy essentially the same position as do the state courts,
they must regard as authoritative the pronunciations of policy delivered by the highest courts of the states. 2 But in
view of the usual role of public policy in conflict of laws an
argument exists for excluding state court decisions declaring state policy from the operation of the Erie case.
Indeed it may be said that even in cases in which jurisdiction attaches on the ground of diversity of citizenship there
may be questions of federal policy as well as state policy.
In such situations federal policy must control to the extent
that it is in conflict with state policy. Rules designed to protect state courts against being imposed upon in certain ways
may sensibly be regarded as procedural in character and disregarded under the Erie case.
Thus it will be seen that when the court in the case
under consideration excluded the statute from having any
effect upon the jurisdiction of the district court the solution
of the problem was not complete. Since the statute deprived
the state courts of jurisdiction in such actions 3 3 there could
be no authoritative rulings of such courts on the question of
whether Illinois public policy dictated that such courts decline to exercise jurisdiction. Under the analysis suggested
above, the Circuit Court of Appeals was required to answer
this question for itself in the light of what it might think the
effects would be in Illinois of allowing such actions. And the
purpose of the statute would be important here. In addition,
302 Notice the attitude of the same Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent case
of Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F. (2d) 754 (1940). In this case the court indicated
that it would be bound by Wisconsin decisions on the question of whether or not
provisions of a trust instrument intended to prevent participation by a divorced
wife of the beneficiary under a spendthrift clause were against public policy. In
the absence of any Wisconsin decisions on the question, the court followed what
it believed to be the weight of authority. See comments on this case in 53 Harv.
L. Rev. 1059 and 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1123.
303 Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227, 125 N.E. 20 (1919).
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the court was required to consider whether or not federal
policy or statutes required the district court to exercise the
jurisdiction which admittedly it possessed. The Erie case
left unsettled many questions and has emphasized the importance of the use of the substance and procedure technique
to avoid its doctrine. 04 The role of public policy in conflict
of laws cases arising in the federal courts because of diversity of citizenship is one of the important unsolved problems.
CREDITORS' RIGHTS

Several Illinois Supreme Court cases in this field should
be noticed. In Blaszynski v. Starczewski 05 three parcels of
lots were levied upon and sold. Parcel No. 1 was a homestead. It would seem that No. 1 was first offered separately,
then in combination with the other parcels, but no bid received. Finally all three parcels were sold en masse for
$1,600. The court denied the purchaser the right to maintain ejectment on parcel No. 1, because homestead had not
been extinguished in accordance with paragraph 9 of the
Exemptions Act,80° which provides that no sale shall be
made unless a greater sum than $1,000 is bid for a homestead. The court indicated that the value fixed on the homestead parcel by appraisal was immaterial and furnished no
basis for presuming that at least $1,000 of the $i,600 was bid
for the homestead parcel.
In the second case, Ingalls v. Raklios, 0 7 the Supreme
Court has nullified the unfortunate decision of the same name
in the Appellate Court."'5 The latter court had held that despite the amendment to Section 5 of Chapter 77, dealing with
body executions,0 ' the pleadings might be searched to de304 See L. K. Tunks, "Categorization and Federalism:
'Substance' and 'Procedure' after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins," 34 Ill. L. Rev. 271 (1939).
305 373 Ill. 140, 25 N.E. (2d) 884 (1940).
306 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 52, § 9.
307 373 Ill. 404, 26 N.E. (2d) 468 (1940).
308 301 Ill. App. 1, 21 N.E. (2d) 856 (1939). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REViEW 61.
309 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 77,
5: "No execution shall issue against
the body of the defendant, except when the judgment shall have been obtained
for a tort committed by such defendant, or unless the defendant shall have
been held to bail upon a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum [respondendum] as
provided by law, or he shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his
creditors."
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 5: "No execution shall issue against the body of
the defendant except when the judgment shall have been obtained for a tort
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termine whether or not malice was the gist of the action.
Mr. Justice Burke, dissenting, pointed out that the principal
object of the amendment was to obviate this practice by requiring a specific finding that malice was the gist of the
action. In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court stresses
the fact that under the amendment the duties of the clerk in
issuing the writ are purely ministerial and that he may not
search the pleadings. The correctness of this decision seems
obvious.
The Supreme Court handed down another decision, bearing obliquely upon Section 5 of the Judgments act, in Greene
v. Noonan,31 0 in which it held
that where the declaration consists of several counts, one or more of
which state a cause of action the gist of which is malice, with others
based upon negligence only, and the verdict is general, without specifying
the count on which it is based, the presumption is that the verdict is
based upon a cause of action of which malice is the gist.

All that it was necessary for the court to decide was that
the refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict on the malice count for want of evidence constituted prejudicial error.
Unfortunately, the court seems to have gone out of its way
to revive certain phases of the objectionable doctrine of Jernberg v. Mix"' and In re Petition of Blacklidge, 12 which
the amendment was designed to correct.
In People v. West Town State Bank,311 the Supreme
Court introduces its decision with a querying statement of
the issue:
Where the receiver of a banking corporation timely disaffirms a lease to
the bank, containing no provision for damages for breach of a covenant
to pay rent, can the lessor maintain a claim for rent accruing after such
disaffirmance or for anticipatory damages for breach of covenant?

The court then answered its own question in the negative
committed by such defendant, and it shall appear from a special finding of the
jury, or from a special finding by the court, if the case is tried by the court
without a jury, that malice is the gist of the action, and except when the defendant shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his creditors. [As
amended by act approved July 11, 1935. L. 1935, p. 937.]"
310 372 Ill. 286, 23 N.E. (2d) 720 (1939). Note, 28 Ill. B. J. 184.
311 199 Ill.
254, 65 N.E. 242 (1902).
312 359 Ill.
482, 195 N.E. 3 (1935).
313 373 Ill. 106, 25 N.E. (2d) 509 (1940), noted, post, Discussion of Recent Decisions.
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and reversed the Appellate Court which had held that the
landlord was entitled to allowance of his claim for damages
accrued prior to the hearing.' 4 The decision of the circuit
court, allowing claims for repairs, for attorney's fees incurred in the enforcement of the covenants, and for a commission paid to a real estate broker who rerented the property,
was reinstated, but with one change. This modification was
a generous proviso that the landlord would be secured against
rent losses before any distribution to the stockholders of the
lessee-bank, in the event that all the other claims were paid.
The denial of the right to damages for loss of rent was placed
on the ground that, owing to the absence of a liquidated
damage clause, the claim was speculative at the time of the
appointment of the receiver, but this line of reasoning is a
little difficult to reconcile with the allowance of a brokerage
commission for the rerental of the premises after the receiver's disaffirmance of the lease. It is submitted that a
more just result would have been attained by the evaluation
and allowance of the claim with due regard to the fortuitous
nature of the damages.
In Rowoldt v. Cook County Farmers Mutual Insurance
Company1 5 the Appellate Court laid down the bald proposition, seemingly for the first time, that after a judgment
debtor has waived his right to have realty taken first, the
garnishee is not entitled to file the special defense of the
existence of real estate.
Shades of Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses, Inc. v. City
3 1 stalked the Appellate Court when that court
of Chicago
17
held in Northwestern Yeast Company v. City of Chicago,
that a property owner's failure to protest against the payment of a condemnation judgment without including interest
thereon, and acceptance of the amount of the judgment allegedly without knowledge of the right to interest did not
preclude subsequent recovery of such interest. Two justices
overruled the contention of the third that the acceptance of
314 People v. West Town State Bank, 299 Ill. App. 242, 20 N.E. (2d) 156 (1939).
Note, 17 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 289.
315 305 Ill. App. 93, 26 N.E. (2d) 903 (1940).
316 369 Ill. 480, 17 N.E. (2d) 1 (1938). Notes, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 189;
52 Harv. L. Rev. 532; 27 Ill. B. J. 238; 33 Ill. L. Rev. 854.
317 301 Ill. App. 303, 22 N.E. (2d) 781 (1939).
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the amount of the judgment without protest constituted some
type of accord and satisfaction. They state that "the plaintiff could not have the intention to waive a right of which
it had no knowledge." The Turk case,3 1 establishing the
right to interest under such circumstances was not decided until after the payment in question.
A case of vital concern, to Chicago lawyers at least, is
that of Trade Bond & Mortgage Company v. Schwartz.31 9 The
Uniform Stock Transfer Act 20 provides in part:
A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a certificate [of stock] shall
be entitled to such aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction and otherwise, in attaching such certificate or in satisfying the claim
by means thereof as is allowed at law or in equity, in regard to property
which cannot readily be attached or levied upon by ordinary legal process.

The Appellate Court held that the Municipal Court of Chicago,
in a case in which it had issued judgment and execution,
was a "court of appropriate jurisdiction." The Appellate
Court conceded that the Municipal Coiirt was not a court of
general chancery jurisdiction, but based its decision primarily upon the inherent power of a court of record to make its
judgments "binding and operative."
An interesting but unsuccessful experiment in the realm
of garnishment was attempted in Cohen v. North Avenue
State Bank. 2 ' After obtaining a decree against forty-eight
stockholders of an insolvent bank, the judgment creditors
instituted a single garnishment suit against twenty-seven different banks in the Chicago area; the affidavit therefore was
made by an attorney for the creditors. After condemning
the suit as a "fishing expedition" the court observed,
We think it is so self-evident that even the court will take judicial notice
of the fact that one practicing lawyer in Chicago did not have just reason
to believe that the 27 banks were indebted to the 48 persons.

In a similar case, however, the creditors fared better. In
Hillmer v. Chicago Bank of Commerce322 a single garnishment proceeding against four brokerage firms for the pur318 Turk v. City of Chicago, 352 I1. 171, 185 N.E. 258 (1933).
319 303 Il. App. 165, 24 N.E. (2d) 892 (1940). Note, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviW 420.
320 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32, § 429.
321 304 Il. App. 413, 26 N.E. (2d) 691 (1940).
322 304 Ill. App. 430, 26 N.E. (2d) 726 (1940).
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pose of reaching debts due 154 judgment debtors was sustained. The cases seem to indicate several collateral propositions pretty clearly: (1) that garnishment will lie as well
upon an equitable decree as upon a legal judgment, (2) that
the number of parties who may be joined in garnishment
would seem to be limited only to the field of plausibility of
the affidavit, and (3) that the mere circumstance that separate executions have been returned is immaterial to such
multiple garnishment.
Several other miscellaneous decisions affecting creditors' rights should be mentioned briefly. In Bailey Meter
Company v. Owens-Illinois Glass Company,2 3 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a subcontractor who furnishes material to a principal in Illinois but files no lien
therefor within sixty days, may not later, after the principal
has paid the contractor and upon finding that the material
furnished is defective, revive the period for filing claims by
repairing the defective material without cost. In Berry v.
24
Ackerman1
the Illinois Appellate Court held that a delay
of sixty-three days between the filing of the affidavit and
issuance of the writ on one hand and the making of the
statutory publication on the other, does not deprive the court
of jurisdiction. In Vandever v. Hill325 the Appellate Court
applied to judicial sales made under direction of the probate
court the chancery rule for holding liable defaulting purchasers at judicial sales. The court states that rule to be as
follows:
It has long been the law of this State in chancery cases, that in order to
charge a purchaser under a judicial sale who refuses to complete his
purchases, with a deficiency arising on a resale, the first sale should be
reported to the court, the report confirmed, and an order served on the
purchaser to pay the purchase money within a given time or in default
the premises would be resold at his risk.

The sale of real estate in the probate court was one to pay
debts, and the plaintiff, who had not complied with the chancery rule, unsuccessfully contended for a different rule for
a sale by a court not of general chancery jurisdiction.
108 F. (2d) 469 (1939).
305 Ill. App. 554, 27 N.E. (2d) 551 (1940), noted, post, Discussion of Recent
Decisions.
325 302 IMI.App. 18, 23 N.E. (2d) 68 (1939).
323
324
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GOVERNMENT
TAXATION

Two more sales tax cases may be added to the list of
exclusions following the Revzan case.3 26 In P. H. Mallen
Company v. Department of Finance'27 the Supreme Court
held the Retailers' Occupational Tax Act328 not applicable
to sales of medicines and pharmaceutical preparations to
physicians, hospitals, and sanitariums. The court was unable to see any distinction between such sales and sales of
optical supplies to optometrists. It had already held the latter exempt, upon the ground that the vendees did not "use
and consume" the merchandise within the meaning of the
act. 29 Following the same line of reasoning, in C. & E.
Marshall Company v. Ames 33 0 the court excluded from the
operation of the act sales of jeweler's supplies to persons and
firms engaged in the business of assembling and repairing
watches and clocks.
In keeping with the trend of interest from substantive
principles of inclusion to procedural matters, the Supreme
Court has passed upon several of the latter problems. Probably the most controversial point of sales tax procedure has
been the time within which returns must be made by the
Department of Finance, practically speaking, in order to
serve as a basis for additional assessment. The modification "practically speaking" is employed advisedly. Ordinarily the only reliable evidence in such matters consists of
the taxpayer's records. Obviously such evidence is not available after the taxpayer has destroyed those books. Under
the act as originally enacted, the taxpayer was required to
preserve his records "for at least two years." 33' Inasmuch
as returns corrected by the department are made prima
facie correct by the statute, it follows that after the taxpayer has destroyed his books and stripped himself of the means
of overcoming such presumption, the returns as corrected
326 Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 Ill.180, 18 N.E.

(2d) 219 (1938).

Note, 17 CHICAGO-

KENT LAW REvIEw 192.
327 372 fll. 598, 25 N.E. (2d) 43 (1940).
828 11. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq.

329 American Optical Co. v. Nudelman, 370 Ill.
627, 19 N.E. (2d) 582 (1939).
380 373 Ill.
381, 26 N.E. (2d) 483 (1940).
331 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1935, Ch. 120, § 446.
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by the department are for all practical purposes conclusive.
In Hoffman & Morton Company v. Department of Finance,"'
the Supreme Court, with one justice dissenting, held that
such corrections may not be made after the two years have
passed and the taxpayer has destroyed his books. The position of the department and of the dissenting justice, and, one
may suppose, of the circuit judge who was reversed, was
that a statute of limitations does not run against the state.
In refutation of this the majority calls attention to the exception which exists when the estate itself indicates that a particular limitation shall run against it, an exception conceded
by the minority. The majority has no hesitancy about finding
such an obvious intention here, observing that "the State
does not enact laws for the entrapment of its citizens." Inasmuch as taxpayers are now required to preserve their records for three years33 3 and inasmuch as the making of assessments is limited to the same period (in the absence of
fraud), the question is not likely to arise in connection with
transactions subsequent to the new statutory arrangement.
There are, however, numerous situations which will be controlled by the present decision, which, incidentally, seems
obviously correct and just.
33 4 the Supreme
In Novicki v. Department of Finance
Court held that the Department of Finance could not sustain
an assessment with hearsay evidence after the taxpayer had
overcome the prima facie presumption of correctness of the
assessment by introducing his own books. The taxpayer
operated a tavern and the department introduced statements
copied from books of beer vendors. In contending that this
hearsay was admissable, the department, and presumably
the nisi prius judge, relied upon the provision of the statute
that the department should not be bound by technical rules
of evidence." 5 The Supreme Court construed this common
provision in the customary manner, that is, as not including
within the category of "technical rules of evidence" the hearsay rule. The department hoped to bring its proceedings
332 373 Ill. 116, 25 N.E.

(2d) 513 (1940).

333 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 446.
334 373 Ill. 342, 26 N.E. (2d) 130 (1940).
335 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 447.
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within an exception to the general rule recognized in a long
line of tax cases, which in the instant case the court admits
hold that
an officer who is empowered to review tax assessments is not bound by
the evidence introduced by the taxpayer, but has a right to act upon
his own knowledge and judgment and to use any available means of
information; and that he may hear affidavits or unsworn testimony
without giving an opportunity for cross-examination.

In the instant case the Supreme Court limits these decisions
to proceedings involving the determination of the value of
property for property tax purposes, and, of course, distinguished the proceedings of the department as involving
the assessment of an excise tax laid upon the privilege of
doing business.
The problem of notice and hearing was considered again
in an entirely different type of tax case, and one of far greater significance, Barnett v. Cook County.33 7 With Mr. Justice
Wilson alone dissenting, and that without opinion, the Supreme Court invalidated the second Pre-adjudication Tax
Act 33 8 upon the ground that it involved a denial of due process of law, in that it would have the effect of allowing in
personam judgments to be entered against nonresidents
without personal service or sufficient notice. It was upon
the general ground of lack of due process for insufficiency of
notice that the first act of 1937 was stricken down in Griffin
v. County of Cook,339 a year ago. It had been generally supposed that this defect was remedied by adding to the publication of notice the giving of notice in the statute itself of
the date for the confirmation proceeding. The advantages
which would flow from testing the tax rate in advance of
spreading the tax are well known and obvious. The legislation is much needed. Yet the language of the opinion is curiously disheartening. No feasible means of remedying the
336 People v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556, 139 N.E. 113 (1923); People v. St. Louis Bridge
Co., 291 Ill. 95, 125 N.E. 752 (1920); In re Maplewood Coal Co., 213 Ill. 283, 72 N.E.
786 (1904); Pratt v. Raymond, 188 Ill. 469, 59 N.E. 16 (1900); Earl & Wilson v.
Raymond, 188 Ill. 15, 59 N.E. 19 (1900); Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby, 134 Inl. 557,
25 N.E. 660 (1890).
337 373 Il. 516, 26 N.E. (2d) 862 (1940).
338 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 812 et seq.
339 369 Ill. 380, 16 N.E. (2d) 906, 118 A.L.R. 1157 (1938). Notes, 18 CHICAGO-KENT
LAw REvIEw 66; 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 326.
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defect in the act is suggested, and the further defects raised
in the special concurring opinion in the Griffin case are not
even discussed. From reading the opinion in the Barnett
case one receives rather definitely the impression that the
court regards the legislation as incurable and the present decision as its death knell. Nevertheless, one cannot refrain
from expressing the fond hope that discouragement will not
prevent further attempts to save the legislation and secure
its benefits.
A decision of perhaps equal interest and importance is
that in Hart v. Toman, 4 0 in which the Supreme Court seemingly lays down the bald and broad proposition that the stock
of foreign corporations is not taxable in Illinois if such corporations have paid a tax within this state upon tangible personal property. The decision is contrary to the practice
heretofore prevailing; hence, quite revolutionary. Although
the court stressed the fact that 97.7901 per cent of all the
tangible property of the corporation was located within the
state of Illinois, seemingly the decision would be equally applicable to a situation where only 1 per cent of the property
was located within the state. The decision is based upon the
construction of the proviso in subdivision 4 of Section 3 of the
Revenue Act then in force:
Provided, that in all cases where the tangible property or capital
stock of any company or association is assessed under this Act, the
shares of capital stock of such company or association shall not be
3 41
assessed or taxed in this State.

The question of whether or not this proviso is limited to domestic corporations, to a provision concerning which it is
apparently apositive, is answered in the negative. The court
treats the "or" as disjunctive, and holds that since domestic
corporations are, and foreign corporations are not, subject
to our capital stock tax, the provision with respect to tangible
property must have reference to foreign corporations. By
implication the decision would seem to praise and damn the
legislature in the same breath, to praise it by attributing to
it an amazing perspicacity with respect to the probable ef340 373 Ill. 462, 26 N.E. (2d) 501 (1940), noted, post, Discussion of Recent Decisions.
341 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 502.
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fect of its language, and to damn it by attributing to it an
intention of creating a capricious taxing situation. If the
stock of a ten million dollar foreign corporation is owned
solely by residents of Illinois the entire ten million dollars
worth of stock is taxable in Illinois if the corporation has no
tangible property here assessable, but is not if the corporation has ten dollars worth of property assessable somewhere
in the state. Inasmuch as the foreign corporation is not subject to capital stock tax either, it finds itself with a decided
advantage over domestic corporations. The situation obviously demands legislative consideration and action.
Two other tax cases are worthy at least of passing notice.
In People v. Armiger,42 a revocable trust had been created
in 1923 for payment of income to a beneficiary for life with a
remainder over, with provision that investment of funds or
change of principal should be made only with consent of the
settlor or of the beneficiary after the settlor's death. The
Supreme Court held that the transfer was not one "intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after such
death," and so not taxable except as to property transferred
into the trust subsequent to the amendment of 1933.3 4 3 Specific effect was given to the proviso of the amendment that it
should not apply to transfers prior to July 1, 1933. In the
other case, People v. Morton,3 44 the court held that the Morton Arboretum was not subject to taxation. The donors of
the trust thus exempted as charitable had established a foundation to carry on practical scientific research in horticulture
and arboriculture in an outdoor museum under natural conditions, and to record and preserve the results obtained.
PUBLIC UTILITIES

The Illinois Supreme Court has handed down what would
seem to be its most important rate decision, at least in recent years, in Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company v. Slattery. 43 The Illinois Commerce Commission had, in substance, by various orders, refused to permit an increase in
372 Ill. 415, 24 N.E. (2d) 355 (1939).
Iml. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 375 (3); Laws 1933, p. 889.
344 373 Ill.
72, 25 N.E. (2d) 504 (1940).
345 373 Ill. 31, 25 N.E. (2d) 482 (1940). "No substantial federal question" noted
by the United States Supreme Court, 84 L. Ed. (Adv.) 649 (1940). Note, 18 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEW 279.
342
343
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Chicago gas rates. The gas company had successfully enjoined the orders of the commission in the Circuit Court of
Cook Courty. That court had reviewed the evidence and,
among other things, upon a basis of conflicting evidence,
set a value on the company's property higher than that set
by the commission. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court and sustained the commission. We may pass over
the interesting treatment of the Smyth v. Ames 346 problem,
and note particularly the position of the Supreme Court on
the question of judicial review. In dismissing the chancellor's valuation because based upon conflicting testimony the
court says, "We cannot say the value fixed by the commission was shown to be unreasonably low." On the matter of
depreciation allowance the court observes that the
commission is presumed to be an expert body itself, and the fixing of
the amount allowable for annual depreciation was entirely within its
province, which we are not at liberty to disturb unless we find its action
arbitrary or unreasonable.

Such language would seem to come very close to flying
directly in the face of the Ben Avon34 7 and St. Joseph's
Stockyards3 4 8 decisions and to place the court in the position
of following precisely that course which caused the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to be overruled in the former case.
Certainly it constitutes going beyond the strong presumption
of the St. Joseph's case, even if it be assumed that on a
chancery appeal the Appellate Court may substitute its discretion for that of the chancellor and itself make the "independent determination" of the issue of confiscation. It would
seem here that the court has not only set aside the "independent determination" of the circuit court but felt itself not
at liberty to make an independent determination of the facts
underlying the issue of confiscation. Why the Supreme Court
noted "no substantial federal question" and declined to review, one may only speculate. Perhaps it is because the
complexion of that court has changed. Perhaps it is because
it feels that the tenuousness of the line between the "inde169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527,
64 L. Ed. 908 (1920).
348 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720,
80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
346
347
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pendent determination" and the "strong presumption" has
been demonstrated in the curious situation of the St. Joseph's
case itself. Perhaps the court felt that no great injustice had
been done and simply did not care to pass upon the perplexing question again at this time.
In Village of West City v. Illinois Commercial Telephone
Company,4 9 the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a municipal ordinance which revoked the original franchise permitting the telephone company to use the public streets, in
return for benefits to be derived by the inhabitants and free
service for the village itself, and sought to impose an annual
charge of a dollar a pole. The court rejected the contention
that the original agreement was a mere license and further
held immaterial the fact that the original grantee had dissolved subsequent to assigning its franchise to the present
company.
In Barry v. Commonwealth Edison Company,350 the Appellate Court has decided what would seem to be the only
Illinois case on the problem of whether or not a decision of a
utility commission operates by analogy to res judicata with
respect to subsequent litigation. Seemingly the defendant had
disconnected the plaintiff's electric service on the ground
that he was procuring unmetered current for his tavern by
means of a "jumper" on his electric meter. Service was restored only upon the payment in part and agreement to pay
the balance of $800 for such current. The plaintiff then filed a
complaint before the Illinois Commerce Commission, attempting to recover the money paid and for other relief.
Upon dismissal of the complaint, he filed a complaint in the
Superior Court of Cook County in three counts: (1) to recover
the sums paid, (2) for damage to his business, and (3) for
slander. The Appellate Court sustained the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the plaintiff was precluded by
the Commission's dismissal. While the court does not use
the term res judicata, it does say:
The essential fact which plaintiff seeks to establish as a basis for a
money judgment has finally and conclusively been determined to the
contrary in the proceeding before the commission.
849 372 IMl. 493, 24 N.E. (2d) 352 (1939).
850 302 IM. App. 558, 24 N.E. (2d) 220 (1939).
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Upon the general problem, however, the decision is greatly
weakened by the specific provision in the statute that failure to appeal from the order of the commission shall be
deemed a waiver of a right to have the matter heard by a
3 51
court.
Rockwell Lime Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission 52 involves another interesting problem of administrative procedure in connection with our utilities commission.
The rather involved situation simmers down to a refusal on
the part of that commission to take jurisidction of a reparation proceeding based upon intrastate charges. The ground
of refusal was that the Interstate Commerce Commission had
assumed control of such rates' to remove discrimination
against interstate commerce. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court reversing the Illinois
Commerce Commission and ordering it to award reparations.
The gist of the decision seems to be that the order of the federal commission was not properly introduced into evidence,
but merely referred to. The Supreme Court evidently regards
the situation as identical with that in the Abilene case "53
and treats the federal order solely as fact to be treated as
such. This is probably fair enough; yet, one cannot but wonder at the fact that the opinion does not even suggest the possibility that an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission may stand on a somewhat different basis from ordinary
facts and that something analogous to judicial notice might
be taken of it. 54
MISCELLANEOUS

Several important questions regarding the exercise of
the veto power of the Governor were passed upon by the Supreme Court during the past year. Under the Constitution of
1870 the Governor has ten days (Sundays excepted) within
which to consider bills passed by the General Assembly and
may sign such bills, allow them to become laws without his
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 111 , §§ 38, 64, 68, 72 and 76.
373 Ill. 309, 26 N.E. (2d) 99 (1940).
353 United States v. Abilene & Southern R. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 44 S. Ct. 317, 68 L.
Ed. 1016 (1924).
354 See Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 197
N.E. 578 (1935), and W. Gellhorn, "Administrative Law," Cases and Comments
(Chicago: Foundation Press, 1940), p. 655 et seq.
351
352
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signature, or return them to the legislature.155 It is further
provided that where the General Assembly, by their adjournment, prevent the return of bills, such bills shall be filed,
with the Governor's objections, in the office of the Secretary
of State, within ten days after such adjournment, or become
laws. The question arose as to whether the ten-day period
began to run from the date bills were presented to the Governor or from the date of a sine die adjournment of the General Assembly. 5 6
In a comprehensive opinion, the court held that the tenday period begins to run from the date a bill is presented to
the Governor. 5 7 In arriving at this conclusion the court
divided bills into four classes: first, bills presented more than
ten days before adjournment; second, those presented on the
day of adjournment; third, those presented less than ten
days before adjournment; and fourth, those presented after
adjournment. Bills falling in the third and fourth classes presented the problem of when the ten-day period began to run.
The court reconciled the apparently conflicting language of
the constitutional provisions and held that, in the case of bills
falling in the third class, adjournment does not operate to increase the length of time allowed the Governor, and in the
case of bills falling in the fourth class, adjournment does not
operate to shorten the period. 5 s The last point required the
court to hold, also, that bills may be presented to the Governor after a sine die adjournment. The arguments of the court
are the usual onces based upon the doctrine of separation of
powers. In a later case involving the same question the court
held that the Governor has no power to refuse to accept a
bill presented after adjournment. 59
In an interesting opinion handed down late in 1939 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute
Although the
making women eligible for jury service."
Constitution of 1870 guarantees the right to trial by jury as at
V, § 16.
Apparently prior governors had uniformly treated the day of presentment as
the day on which the period began to run.
357 People v. Hughes, 372 Ill. 602, 25 N.E. (2d) 75 (1940).
358 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 320.
359 People v. Hughes, 373 IMI. 144, 25 N.E. (2d) 801 (1940).
855 Ill. Const. 1870, Art.
356

People v. Traeger, 372 Ill. 11, 22 N.E. (2d) 679 (1939).
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common law, the court took the view that qualifications of
jurors were no part of the constitutional right. Thus the legislature had power to modify such qualifications. Such cases
exhibit the technique of adapting the common-law tradition to
modern ways of life. 6'
Three other cases, treated more extensively elsewhere
in the pages of the present issue of this journal, deserve passing mention here also. Village of South Holland v. Stein. "
was one of the current crop of cases involving the organization known as "Jehovah's Witnesses." The Supreme Court,
citing such recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States as Lovell v. City of Griffin,3 ' held a village
ordinance unconstitutional as violating the guaranties of
freedom of speech and of the press, if applied to require a
license for the distribution of books or pamphlets. 64
In the important rate case of Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Company v. Slattery365 the Supreme Court, among other
matters, decided that the provisions of the Public Utility Act
must be interpreted to permit independent injunctive action
in equity even where a statutory appeal from a rate of the
Commerce Commission is not taken. This court indicated
that this interpretation (which renders the statutory provision completely inoperative) is necessitated in order to avoid
depriving equity courts of their constitutional jurisdiction and
to avoid an unconstitutional denial of the right of judicial
review of orders of the Commerce Commission. 8 6 The case
of Corcoran v. City of Chicago6 ' upholding the constitutionality of the provision of the Civil Practice Act 68 providing
that the Appellate Courts may review "error of fact, in that
the judgment, decree or order appealed from is not sustained by the evidence or is against the weight of the evidence,"
is fully discussed elsewhere in the present issue.3 9 The provision was assailed on the ground that it takes from the successful party in jury cases his right to a jury trial.
361 18 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 103.
362 373 III. 472, 26 N.E. (2d) 868 (1940).
363 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938).
364 See discussion, supra, under Municipal Corporations-Police Power.
365 373 Ill. 31, 25 N.E. (2d) 482 (1940).
366 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 279.
367 373 Ill. 567, 27 N.E. (2d) 451 (1940).
368 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, 9 216.
369 See Notes and Comments, post.
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Finally, one further case dealing with the preferred position of the state in litigation may be mentioned. In People
v. Bradford7 ' it was decided, two justices dissenting, that
the doctrine of estoppel is not applicable to the State acting
in its sovereign capacity. Prior Illinois cases appeared to
throw some doubt upon this position and the court went into
the facts to decide whether there might here be an exception
to the rule as stated. Bradford was Director of the Department of Conservation and had deposited funds to his official
credit in a bank. The bank failed and only a partial recovery
was secured in an action by the State for a preference. Bradford was not a party to this litigation. The estoppel was asserted in this subsequent action brought against him and his
surety to collect the balance. State law required Bradford
to pay funds received into the State Treasury and prescribed
the form of currency for such funds. The State Treasurer refused to accept checks and drafts from him because of these
provisions. At the direction of the Governor, Bradford procured a cashier's check for the amount of his deposit and
presented it to the State Treasurer. The check was not presented for payment until three days later, on which day the
bank issuing the check closed. The court held that these
facts did not require an exception to the general rule that the
State, acting in its governmental capacity, cannot be estopped by the acts and conduct of its officers. Since estoppel
and similar defenses are ordinarily not available against the
State, the Bradford case is of interest as indicating a view
that there may be situations where exceptions are justified. 71
870

372 Ill. 63, 22 N.E. (2d) 691 (1939).

371 See 35 Ml. L. Rev. 113.

